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ABSTRACT 
Robert Brandom denies animals implicit reasoning by emphasizing their inability to 
make inferences explicit, and in so doing, denigrates animals by likening their behavior to that of 
machines and artifacts. I contest, however, that animals are paradigmatically more than any 
similarity or analogy to mechanical processing, just as humans are paradigmatically more than 
any reductive analogy to animals. The human/animal distinction need not come at the cost of 
ignoring the difference between animals and artifacts, and I believe we can largely subscribe to 
Brandom’s differentiation of the human in terms of expressionism if we allow that animals can 
make implicit inferences without making them explicit. 
After exposing in Chapter One Brandom’s ghettoizing of animal minds, I show in the 
following chapters what it might look like for humans to perform explication on behalf of 
implicit animal inferences. In Chapter Two I show where Brandom departs from Heidegger, and 
how there would otherwise be a place for animals in his thought. After revising Brandom along 
more orthodox Heideggerian lines, I explore in Chapter Three the early Heidegger’s concept of 
the world in terms of Dasein, animals, and unworlded things with an eye towards Brandom’s 
inferentialism. In Chapter Four I employ Mark Okrent’s teleological understanding of rationality 
to fill out Heidegger’s suggested view of animals. I conclude the thesis by showing how humans 











TRADITIONS AND TERMS 
 
 
The charge I bring against Robert Brandom is that in formulating his philosophy of mind 
and language, he precludes any kind of mental life for animals, even higher-order animals. As 
Alasdair MacIntyre points out, this oversight, in both analytic and continental circles, results 
from the linguistic turn, where the over-emphasis on human discourse misconstrues our 
understanding of intentionality, beliefs and desires, meaning, and communication.
1
 It may seem 
odd, then, that I hope to rectify Brandom along Heideggerian lines, since, according to 
MacIntyre (and others), Heidegger is one of the chief continental culprits of 
anthropomorphism—or more specifically, what Nelson Goodman calls “linguomorphism.”
2
 I 
must therefore explain how and why this traditional reading of Heidegger on animals is 
mistaken. 
 First, as MacIntyre himself points out, language as such is a major (and most likely the 
major) difference between humans and other animals. Language is what makes introspection and 
philosophy possible, what makes art and religion possible. Thus any correction of philosophers 
like Brandom and Heidegger cannot simply abandon language as essentially tied to the distinctly 
human experience. That is, language profoundly shapes or enables the human mind to be what it 
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 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Peru, 
IL: Open Court, 1999), 12. 
2








is. Unfortunately, many twentieth-century philosophers conflate language and mind, and see the 
mind as such as inseparable from language.
3
 
 Brandom outright links the mind with language, and doesn’t allow the two to be 
separated: since animals don’t have language, they don’t have minds. Heidegger, since he waxes 
philosophical about the importance of language for world (and implicitly mind), is often viewed 
in a similar light: his choice of animals—lizards, bees, snails—emphasizes the animal as other, 
la bête in every sense of the word. And yet, as I’ll argue, it’s a mistake to read Heidegger as 
overly anthropocentric. Though Dasein is his foremost interest, his philosophy can account for 
animals in a non-disparaging way; Brandom’s account at best uses animals metaphorically to 
explain what humans are not. 
According to Heidegger, things are given as zuhanden or vorhanden, and we share the 
former experience of things with animals; Brandom’s bifurcation of inferences as implicit and 
explicit makes the two inseparable, and animals can’t have the first since they lack the second. 
Consequently, Heidegger doesn’t view animals as worldless (like rocks), just world-poor, 
whereas Brandom views animals as mindless machines, simply responding mechanically to the 
world (like thermostats). If, hypothetically, Brandom had allowed for animals to have implicit 
inferences, he, like Heidegger, would have a viable philosophy of animal minds. It’s the goal of 
this thesis to show how Brandom should have (and could have) made this allowance for animals. 
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 MacIntyre carefully shows that animals don’t need language to have beliefs, and while they 
often display advanced forms of communication, no matter how close animals like dolphins are 
to having true language, they ultimately fall short—they could never have human language, 








In Chapter One I explain the problem of animal minds in Brandom’s work. From there I 
locate his departure from Heidegger in hopes of realigning him more charitably towards animals. 
In Chapter Three I discuss Heidegger’s view of animal minds and worlds, showing the shared 
world of Dasein and animals. In Chapter Four I explicate this common world in more analytic 
terms. For this task I primarily employ Mark Okrent’s Rational Animals, though I must also 
critique him at length for linguomorphizing animal minds. The last chapter shows how humans 
can explicate the implicit inferences of animals—thus keeping Brandom’s two-part account of 
mind intact while allowing for the mental lives of animals.  
Before we get started, however, I need to make clear why I don’t take the traditional, 
prima facie reading of Heidegger seriously, and how in fact his philosophy gives a sufficient and 
substantial account of animals. Additionally, we’ll need to be clear about some central terms, 
especially since the continental, analytic, and Aristotelian/Thomistic traditions are all in play 
here. 
 
The Traditional Reading of Heidegger on Animals and its Discontents 
The charge I bring against Brandom is that in formulating his philosophy of mind and 
language, he precludes any kind of mental life for animals, even higher-order animals; Heidegger 
often receives a similar criticism, though it’s usually in terms of world, not mind. As far as this 
thesis goes, I assume that when Heidegger speaks of world and Brandom and others mean of 
mind, they are essentially after the same thing, perception or experience or engagement with 
phenomena. It would seem that Heidegger downplays the phenomenal life of animals, especially 








Brandom, Okrent, and most of the readers of Heidegger in the analytic tradition).
4
 Heidegger’s 
1929-30 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, is 
where he most directly discusses animals; here too it’s easy to misunderstand Heidegger’s 
discussion of the “impoverished” world of animals.
5
  
The problem is that people miss the forest for the trees in these two works: Being and 
Time is specifically about Dasein and Being in regard to Dasein as the being that asks after 
being, and the Concepts of Metaphysics is similarly about Dasein and World in regard to Dasein 
as the being that asks why there is a world and what the world as world means. Often what 
Heidegger is saying about the being of Dasein or Dasein’s experience of the world is mistaken as 
Heidegger’s anti-animal view of being and world, as if we could fault a book about apples for 
not giving a satisfactory account of oranges. Although we might already fault the animal 
enthusiast for this, what’s more amazing is that the general framework that Heidegger is 
establishing in the two works, namely Zu- and Vorhandenheit and being in the world, is actually 
quite charitable towards animals, emphasizing a shared zuhanden engagement with the same 
world.  
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1962); Sein und Zeit (Halle: Niemeyer, 1927). All references to Being and Time, even in 
the English, follow the standard German pagination. 
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 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. 
W. McNeill & N. Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Der Grundbegriffe der 
Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit,   Gesamtausgabe Band 29/30, (Frankfurt am Main: 









 Let’s discuss the traditional, negative reading of Heidegger and animals, and then I’ll 
show how Heidegger is actually linking Dasein and animals in a fundamental, positive way. 
 
Animals in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics is about metaphysics if only in the sense that 
it is a critique and a reformulation of what the tradition means by metaphysics (and thus may 
perhaps be more properly called “anti-metaphysics”).  The first part of the book discusses 
metaphysics in terms of Dasein, logos, and physis, and entails a fittingly dry and drawn-out 
discussion of boredom as a fundamental attunement of Dasein. It is from this discussion of 
metaphysical boredom that the second part of the book derives. In Part Two we have the 
discussion of world and the thesis that the stone is worldless, the animal is world-poor, and man 
is world-forming. Most traditional readings of Heidegger and animals ignore the background 
metaphysics that undergirds the discussion of world and animals, and thus are at a loss to 
understand this tripartite division of natural beings. MacIntyre, for instance, just jumps into the 
discussion of animals as world-poor. 
 MacIntyre does mention what the key difference is between world-forming and world-
poor, though he doesn’t heed this enough: what animals lack is the ability to experience 
something as something. The lizard, Heidegger says, is aware of the warm rock and even seeks it 
out, but the lizard does not know the rock as rock.
6
 Heidegger’s point—and this is abundantly 
clear in the overlooked Part One of the Fundamental Concepts—is that only humans can 
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understand things as things. This is metaphysics. This is philosophy. This is human. We can 
know things as things because we can discourse about things and their essence; animals cannot.
7
 
 Indeed, MacIntyre complains that Heidegger understands “nonhuman animals as such,” 
entirely missing the point that only humans can consider anything “as such.”
8
 Heidegger is 
discussing what makes animals animal, and MacIntyre claims that this carries the “underlying 
assumption…that the differences between nonhuman species are of no importance or almost no 
importance in any relevant sense.”
9
 If by relevant sense we mean metaphysics, then that’s right. 
This is Heidegger’s aim, though in doing so he is doing more than merely addressing animals as 
such, as I’ll explain briefly in the next section and then in more detail in Chapter Three. 
 One of MacIntyre’s main concerns is that Heidegger identifies “captivation” as “the 
fundamental essence of the organism [animal].”
10
 I don’t have the space to adequately expound 
what Heidegger means by this, but, in brief, he means simply the essential poverty of animals. 
Animals are captive to their selves and their environment, but in typical Heideggerian form, this 
captivity is described in terms of openness. It is a very un-Heideggerian reading of MacIntyre to 
read captivity of animals as limiting rather than as opening.  
 MacIntyre comes close to understanding Heidegger’s use of “as” when he agrees that 
animals can’t “grasp the world as a whole,” since this would imply (minimally) a kind of past 
                                                 
 
7
 See, e.g., Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 26-33. 
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and future available only in language; however, he shows again that he misses Heidegger’s point 
by insisting that some higher-order animals understand things “as food or as source of food, as 
partner in or material for play,” etc.
11
 This is not the kind of “as structure” that Heidegger is 
talking about. Both the German als and the English as denote the Latin qua, that is, “in the 
capacity of,” or “as being,” and Heidegger means this in the precise, metaphysical sense 
(categorical description) of something understood anaphorically as being that thing.
12
  
 Joseph J. Kockelmans explains that there are two kinds of “as structures,” the “anaphoric 
as” and the “hermeneutic as.”
13
 Both are the “letting something become manifest”: the 
hermeneutic as is manifest in our “concernful dealing with things,” and the anaphoric as is the 
“articulated structure of understanding something as something.”
14
 The hermeneutic as isn’t 
thematic or articulated; it is the engagement with something as something, food as food, for 
instance. Dasein can take “the structure of something as something” and make it “explicitly 
understood” anaphorically in language, but this is a derivative as structure that we don’t share 
with animals: 
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 MacIntyre, 47. 
12
 “qua,” Oxford English Dictionary. Third edition, December 2007; online version March 2012. 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/155615>; accessed 10 April 2012. An entry for this word was 
first included in New English Dictionary, 1902. I compared the English “as” in the OED with the 
German als in Der Duden in 10 Bänden, Band 2, Stilwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, ed. 
Drosdowski et al. (Dudenverlag: Mannheim, 1988). 
13
 Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Ontological Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language,” in On 
Heidegger and Language, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University 
Press, 1972), 198. See Being and Time, 148-160. 
14








In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it 
circumspectively, we ‘see’ it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; but what 
we have thus interpreted need not necessarily be also taken apart by making an 




A horse may understand hay as food, but it cannot understand hay as hay, or food as food, that is, 
anything as such. “Ein Tier kann sich nur benehmen, aber nie etwas als etwas vernehmen” (an 
animal can only behave (itself), but never examine something as something).
16
 
 Heidegger claims that in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics he is trying to do 
what he did in Being and Time (and “On the Essence of Ground” (1929)), but with a different 
method, namely addressing the problem of world—the question, “What is world?”—that is, his 
“task is to bring the worldly character of the world into view for the first time as the possible 
theme of a fundamental problem of metaphysics.
17
 In the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
the method is a “comparative examination,” asking what the world is for things in the world: 
material objects, animals, and humans. Animals are poor in world in that they have less access to 
world: 
The bee’s world is limited to a specific domain and is strictly circumscribed. And 
this is also true of the world of the frog, the world of the chaffinch and so on. But 
it is not merely the world of each particular animal that is limited in range—the 
extent and manner in which an animal is able to penetrate whatever is accessible 
to it is also limited. The worker bee is familiar with the blossoms it frequents, 
along with their colour and scent, but it does not know the stamens of these 
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 Heidegger, Being and Time, 149. 
16
 Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 376. 
17
 Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 176-178. Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of 
Ground,” trans. William McNeill, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, 97-135 (Cambridge: 








blossoms as stamens, it knows nothing about the roots of the plant…. As against 
this, the world of man is a rich one, greater in range, far more extensive in its 
penetrability, constantly extendable not only in its range…but also in respect to 
the manner in which we can penetrate ever more deeply in this penetrability. 
Consequently we can characterize the relation man possesses to the world by 
referring to the extendability of everything that he relates to. This is why we can 




This does not mean, as MacIntyre suggests, that Heidegger is anthropocentrically evaluating 
bees, frogs, and birds in this light—“Every animal and every species of animal as such is just as 
perfect and complete as any other,” says Heidegger, “this talk of poverty in world and world-
formation must not be taken as a hierarchical evaluation”—nor is he chauvinistically indifferent 
towards our common animality. Indeed, poverty is how man too comports himself:  
poverty is not merely a characteristic property, but the very way in which man 
comports and bears himself [such as in humility or melancholy]. Poverty in this 
proper sense of human existence is also a kind of deprivation and necessarily so. 
Yet from such deprivation we can draw our peculiar power of procuring 




 Heidegger does not use the word poverty pejoratively either when describing animals or 
Dasein. Like every term he employs, he uses it in a very precise sense that must be understood in 
its precise meaning or usage, which usually derives from its etymology, not according to 
preconceived or prima facie senses of the word in isolation from his text. Moreover, this poor 
world actually turns out to be quite rich, as I discuss in Chapter Three. 
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 Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 193. 
19








Animals and Being and Time 
Being and Time is often misread. As I mentioned earlier, those who read it as 
anthropomorphic somehow miss the point that it is about being and time as regards man, and so 
it’s only anthropomorphic in the sense that a book about war is hawkish. Another major 
misunderstanding is to see the breakthrough of Being and Time as drawing our attention to tools 
and equipment. But “It never occurred to me,” says Heidegger, “to try and claim or prove with 
this interpretation [of equipmentality in Being and Time] that the essence of man consists in the 
fact that he knows how to handle knives and forks or use the tram.”
20
 The real breakthrough of 
Being and Time, according to Brandom, is the ontological distinction between Vorhandenheit 
and Zuhandenheit, which emphasizes Dasein’s more originary engagement with the world. 
 Animals are only mentioned three times in Being and Time, and in ways only tangentially 
related to animals as regards the topic at hand. Still, what Heidegger has to say about the being of 
Dasein has (positive) implications for animals. Drawing primarily on The History of the Concept 
of Time: Prolegomena (which is almost a rough draft of Being and Time),
21
 it is my contention 
in Chapter Three that animals have a similar originary engagement with the world, and 
Zuhandenheit is a kind of bond between us and them. In Being and Time, however, Heidegger 
limits his discussion to Dasein, and so we should first mention this distinction in human terms. 
                                                 
 
20
 Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 177. 
21
 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore  Kisiel 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992 [1979]); Prolegomena zur Geschichte des 
Zeitbegriffs, in Gasamtausgabe, Band 20 (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925) 
(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975). When appropriate, I reference the German edition’s 








 In short, Vorhandeneheit (“present-at-hand”) is understanding beings or a being 
objectively, whereas Zuhandenheit (“ready-to-hand,” “handy”) is the direct engagement of 
beings. A hammer can be understood in terms of its shape, weight, color, etc.—scientifically, to 
speak—and it can be understood in its use as a hammer—equipmentally. Heidegger’s insight is 
that Vorhandenheit springs from Zuhandenheit, not the other way around: usefulness or 
engagement isn’t a quality added to an object, as the tradition (through Husserl), would 
understand it.  
Heidegger is often praised for this “inversion” of the subject/object ontological structure, 
but it’s more correct to say that he has gotten to a deeper, more “originary” ontology only from 
which the subject/object dichotomy is possible. This is all important. As Jean-Luc Marion puts it,  
the analysis of the ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) plays a decisive role in the entire 
analytic of Dasein, since it establishes not only that Dasein does not entertain first 
a theoretical relation to the world, but above all that intraworldly entities are not 
in the mode of objects constituted by an objectification produced by the subject, 
but rather in the mode of a handiness which in turn determines Dasein itself as it 




 Although Being and Time pertains specifically to Dasein, this insight into our originary 
engagement with the world applies analogously to animals. It’s my contention in this thesis that 
animals operate (only) zuhanden. Everything, “house and yard, forest and field, sun, light and 
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 ” Jean-Luc Marion, “Le sujet en dernier appel,” Revue de Métaphysque et de Morale 1 (1991): 
78, quoted in François Raffoul, “The Destruction of Vorhandenheit,” in Heidegger and the 
Subject, trans. David E. Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (Humanity Books, Amherst, New York. 
1998), n.6. This chapter of Raffoul’s is especially helpful for understanding how Heidegger’s 










  As François Raffoul puts it, “the whole of entities, insofar as they appear in 
the midst of the environment, are primarily ready-to-hand”
24
; we need only remember for 
animals too, objects in their environment present themselves as ready-to-hand— “the lizard has 
its own relation [eine Beziehung] to the rock, to the sun, and to a host of other things,” as 
Heidegger says.
25
 We are explicitly not to understand the lizard’s relation to his environment as 
“vorhanden”
 26
; the lizard is closer to Dasein than to the rock in that it and all animals have a 
world, however ever poor, and it engages that world as zuhanden. I explain the zuhanden life of 
animals in Chapter Three. 
 
Terminology 
This thesis draws from three traditions and schools of thought which are already in 
dialogue with one another: the analytic, neo-Hegelian pragmatism of Robert Brandom, the 
continental phenomenology and existentialism of Martin Heidegger, and the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic teleology of Mark Okrent and Alasdair MacIntyre. Though the 
philosophers I discuss are all familiar with and draw from each other’s primary traditions, the 
threefold (at least) vocabulary can be confusing—cumbersome at best. I try to be faithful to the 
nuances of the different vocabularies while preserving a clear and consistent usage across the 
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 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 108. Cf. Being and Time 103 and 245. 
24
 Raffoul, 171. 
25










traditions. It may be helpful, however, to here delineate some key terms, both to explain their 
idiosyncratic usage and to clarify how I will use such terms generally in my discussion. I assume 
that the teleological and Heideggerian terms are more familiar that those of Brandom, so I’ll 
explain some of Brandom’s key terms up front, whereas I’ll address the teleological and 
Heideggerian terms as we go.  
I might also add here that I typically reserve the word “animal” to mean a nonhuman 
animal, though this is done for clarity and shouldn’t be seen as downplaying humans as animals 
(after all, Aquinas of all people, as Alasdair MacIntyre points out, is perfectly content with 
calling nonhuman animals “other animals”; distinguishing man from other animals doesn’t imply 
a denial of human animality).
27
 When I do talk of lower- and higher-order animals, I typically am 
referring to animals such as insects as the former and birds and dolphins as the latter, in keeping 
(somewhat reluctantly) with common usage. That I’m uncomfortable with the space between 
lower- and higher-order animals, not to mention those animals that push the extremes towards 
plants and humans, will become clear as we go on. 
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 MacIntyre, 6. Richard Sorabji, by contrast, prefers (“For ease of reading”) not to call 
nonhuman animals “other animals” (or mankind “humankind,” for that matter), “despite [his] 
sympathies.” See his Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate 











Sentience vs. Sapience: “Sentience is a matter of being aware in the sense of being awake that 
we share at least with our vertebrate cousins. Feelings of pain and sensations of red are 
paradigmatic sentient episodes. Sapient states, such as beliefs and intentions, and sapient 
episodes such as thinkings, by contrast, have propositional contents that are expressed in English 
by the use of ‘that’ clauses with declarative sentences as complements.”
29
 Similar dichotomies 
Brandom uses are vocal/verbal
30
 and implicit/explicit (see below). 
 
Implicit/Explicit (inferences, norms, etc.): Implicit inferences or norms don’t depend on an 
attitude or position towards the inference or norm. Brandom claims that litmus paper and iron 
rusting follow rules—they literally obey norms. Expliciting is the act or attitude of making 
implicit inferences and norms explicit. Implicit inference and norms also exist socially, 
linguistically—in every capacity—and they are just as real and objective as iron rusting, though 
not in the sense of top-down platonic truths. Brandom says that animals obey norms and make 
inferences only inasmuch as rusty nails do; for him, implicit reasoning requires expliciting (see 
below).  
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 For a lucid introduction to Brandom’s work, see Jeremy Wanderer’s Robert Brandom 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008). His clarity and my debt to him 
should be evident in this section, in which I draw heavily from him. 
29
 Brandom, “From a Critique of Cognitive Internalism to a Conception of Objective Spirit: 
Reflections on Descombes’ Anthropological Holism,” Inquiry 47 (2004): 238. 
30
 E.g. Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism (Cambridge, MA: 









Expliciting, Making Explicit: For some reason Brandom says “expliciting,” not explicating; 
Jeremy Wander’s helpful introduction to his work doesn’t use the neologism, and he considers 
this concept, central as it is, to be rather unclear and unstable in Brandom’s thought.
31
 What is 
clear is that expliciting is both an ability and a practice. The ability entails language, and 
involves being able to say or explain (explicit) abilities performed implicitly, like what makes for 
a good golf swing. Good expliciting, however, doesn’t depend on good implicit ability, as with 
sports coaches.
32
 One can even make explicit social and linguistic practices and norms, and 
though this is of great interest to Brandom, it doesn’t bear directly on this thesis.  
 Another way to understand making explicit is according to Brandom’s “two-ply account 
of observation.” As Wanderer summarizes it, “claiming that ‘the swatch is red’, involves an 
exercise of two distinct practical capacities…the ability to respond differently to some stimulus, 
and…the ability to make a move in a linguistic practice.”
33
 It’s not enough to be aware of or 
even respond to something implicitly; one must be able to make explicit and engage explicitly 
that thing for there to be real rational activity.  
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Normative: “Normative vocabulary,” explains Wanderer, “involves terms that are fraught with 
ought. Examples include terms such as ‘correct’, ‘should’, ‘good’, ‘permissible’, obligatory’, and 
‘right’.”
34
 Norms exists and are binding regardless of whether or not they are known or even can 
be known (see the next section). 
 When I use the word normativity, I mean the objectively prescriptive good that pertains 
to and supervenes over different categories of things and concepts, the same against which we 
can evaluate instances of such categories. Normativity for animals is the objective structure of 
teleology and flourishing particular to the animal, relevant group of animals, species, etc. I find 
this in keeping with Brandom’s conception of norms, specifically in regards to socio-linguistic 
norms, but it also fully encompasses natural (teleological, evolutionary, etc.) normativity in 
Okrent’s sense and in the Aristotelian/Thomistic sense more generally. 
 Humans have a unique kind of normativity in that the norms that govern our behavior 
aren’t natural but rational. We act based on reasons that transcend the individual and social 
norms set by biology and society. For Brandom, such human norms are Hegelian, though for our 
purposes, just what those norms are doesn’t matter.  
 
Simple vs. Interpreting Performers, Normative Statuses vs. Attitudes: A simple performer’s 
performance can be treated as having a normative status, though the performer doesn’t have a 
normative attitude (in theory or with mechanical or chemical performers). An interpreting 
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performer, by virtue of its normative attitudes, institutes—creates, maintains, or develops—
normative statuses.  
 
Inference: Taking one claim or assertion as the basis for another claim or assertion. This giving 
and taking for reasons is characteristic of sapience. Everything is implicitly connected in a web 
of inferences (tree, wood, house, hammer, nail, roof, rain, to invoke Heidegger here), and to be 
sapient is to draw out these inferences (to make explicit), as well as live and move about in the 
space of reasons, of theoretical inferences (inferences based on beliefs and desires, rules of logic, 
etc.).  
 
Mental Content, Mental States 
Although the distinction between mental content and mental states is not fixed in the 
literature, I adopt Okrent’s usage. For him, mental content is simply the mental stuff that’s there 
(be it some kind of representation or simply perception or whatever), whereas mental states are 
intentional positions in regard to the mental content. More specifically, mental states are the 
“beliefs and desires of rational agents” that persist over time, including “natural” 
(biological/evolutionary) states and “rational” (individual/subjective) states.
35
 
Attributing mental content to animals is innocuous enough, though it doesn’t really work 
with very simple forms of animal life (and so I insist in Chapter Four that we just stick with 
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teleology); attributing mental states, however, is presumptuous and anthropomorphic—indeed 
linguomorphic—since the real fault is to attribute an overly linguoform view of mental life to 
animals, for which we have little justification.  
All animals have mental content or mental perception, whatever that might be like. Of 
course the richness of representation and perception varies greatly from frogs to dogs, and from 
horses to humans, and more basic animals may not have any kind of central “mental” content of 
perception at all. Intentional states are propositional, though not necessarily linguistic (at least in 
principle). The temptation (into which I believe Okrent unwittingly falls) is to think of 
propositions in terms of language; the alternative (my suggestion) would be to think of them not 
as sentences but as modalities.
36
 The implicit grasp of a series of modalities, affected by 
dispositions and desire, is entirely different from the explicit arrangement of propositions, about 
which we can discuss and ponder along with our dispositions and desires. Humans have 
language and reflection; higher-order animals may have a rich and creative grasp of modalities 
and their own motives and dispositions, but we don’t need to appeal to language or introspection 
to explain their mental lives. Indeed, to project language or introspection would be to 
anthropomorphize them—to linguomorphize them—and I argue in Chapter Four that this is 
precisely what Okrent does, despite his great insight into normative teleology. 
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Why Care about this Problem? 
Jeremy Wanderer doesn’t take issue with Brandom’s use of parrots and thermometers as 
counterpoints to human sapience:  
it may seem chauvinistic in the extreme, [but] the intention is not to catalogue 
purported deficiencies designed to elevate the status of man over beast. …Without 
a doubt, this demarcational starting point forces attention on our own case, but 





Why shouldn’t we agree?  
 First, Brandom is too often and too egregiously “beastly towards the beasts,” to use his 
phrase, for us not to level the charge of anthropocentric chauvinism.
38
 I draw this out in Chapter 
1. Additionally, his philosophy is simply wrong when it comes to animals, and so in the interest 
of truth I feel obligated to correct him, especially since his core assumptions (and even some of 
his superfluous ones) don’t commit him to the anti-animal stance he presents. Furthermore, I 
echo MacIntyre’s motive for writing Dependant Rational Animals, that humans are a kind of 
animal, and to misunderstand them is to misunderstand ourselves.
39
 Thus, as insightful as 
Brandom’s work is, it’s deficient in regard to what we share with animals. In this thesis I hope to 
draw out our shared engagement with the world in a way that doesn’t compromise Brandom’s 
philosophy of language and mind but in fact enhances it. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  





As distinguished from the extantness of material things and from the  






Robert Brandom refers to humans as concept-using animals, distinct from other animals 
in their discursive practices, namely in their ability to articulate inferences, and he convincingly 
shows how concepts are commitments that are articulatable within a web of reasons. This web 
links implicit and explicit inferences, and, Brandom claims, is inherently linguistic. If we grant 
Brandom’s definition of linguistic discourse as unique to human cognition (thus precluding 
discussion of putative nonhuman language and discourse, let alone infants and severely impaired 
humans who cannot articulate reasons), we still run into a problem concerning nonhuman, 
higher-order animals (hereafter “animals”), for Brandom lumps animal cognition with 
mechanical computation throughout his major opus, Making It Explicit, and its abbreviated form, 
Articulating Reasons. He often speaks of parrots as a kind of thermostat reacting reliably to 
stimuli and nothing more. The problem has two dimensions: counterintuitive conclusions and 
their corresponding (im)moral implications.  
                                                 
 
40
 This chapter was originally published as “Articulating Animals: Animals and Implicit 
Inferences in Brandom’s Work,” Between the Species 14, no. 1 (2011): 40-56. It is reprinted by 
permission of the editor, Joe Lynch.  
41
 Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Parvis Emad and 








There seems to be an obvious categorical difference between animals such as parrots and 
artifacts such as thermostats, so Brandom’s insistent grouping of the two together fails to 
correspond to our (or at least my) intuitions of reality. Brandom usually associates animals and 
artifacts when he is emphasizing how human perception exceeds mere stimuli—we see red in a 
web of inferences, such as blood, wine, stop, rage, etc. Insofar as Brandom is exaggerating the 
mechanical aspect of animals in order to more clearly contrast them with the discursive aspect of 
humans, we can grant him rhetorical license. The ease and frequency of this reductive gesture, 
however, suggests otherwise. 
Brandom’s philosophical categorization of humans leaves little doubt that he actually 
views animals as biological machines. What would be nondiscursive (pre-linguistic) inferences 
in humans are analogous in animals to the nondiscursive deductions of computers. That is, 
Brandom draws a sharp line between humans and nonhumans: only humans make inferences. If 
animals are no more than machines, we have no more moral duty towards animals than we do 
towards machines. 
Brandom admits that his project “risks being beastly to the beasts” because it focuses on 
“the fanciest sort of intentionally”—ours—“that involves expressive capacities that cannot be 
made sense of apart from participation in linguistic practices.”
42
 He claims that his project 
depends on “the lower grades of intentionality,” presumably of animals, inasmuch as he hopes to 
show how “linguistic abilities arise out of nonlinguistic ones.”
43
 That this pseudo-apology 
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follows a discussion of “Descartes’ seminal demarcational story” should clue the reader into the 
fact that Brandom in truth views animals and artifacts in the same light—both without 
intentionality except in the basest form, such as iron rusting.
44
 The mechanistic logic that denies 
conceptual mental content with language in animals, as found in Descartes, runs throughout 
Brandom’s work. 
The implications of this Cartesian gesture go against our moral intuitions that recognize 
some responsibility towards animals based on their cognitive faculties, emotions, ability to feel 
pain, etc.; but even if this moral intuition, however deeply rooted, is nothing more than an 
argument from analogy, as Peter Harrison claims,
45
 there is still the problem of categorically 
treating animals as machines, at least in the Heideggerian sense of enframing.
46
 That is, the 
intuition that harming an animal is categorically different than “harming” an artifact goes beyond 
mere analogies between humans and animals—we humans evidently recognize that the 
difference between a live animal and a dead animal is not the same as the difference between a 
functioning machine and a defunct machine. I contend that we categorically view living things as 
having inherent value apart from any imputed value we may attribute to animals and artifacts alike. 
To deny this moral obligation humans have towards living things is to label any 
sentiments towards animals as no different from those we may have towards artifacts (a wedding 
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ring, for example). That is, such sentiments could be dismissed in pursuit of, say, science: live 
vivisections of animals would be like tinkering with a running machine. This, as in Descartes’ 
day, goes against our moral intuitions about life and about responsibility towards living things. 
If we believe there is something that makes animals and artifacts ultimately 
incommensurable, namely life, can we make sense of the distinction of living/non-living in light 
of Brandom’s human/nonhuman distinction? That is, would modifying Brandom’s initial 
distinction between humans and nonhumans create room for the distinction between animals and 
artifacts? Or, keeping Brandom’s initial distinction, what further distinctions need to be made to 
separate animals from artifacts? 
We need to briefly go over how Brandom’s theory of inferentialism works before we can 
hope to locate or create a space within the theory for animals. We also need to show how animals 
differ from nonanimals in order to group them with humans in opposition to mere things.  
 
Differentiating Humans from Animals  
Both Making It Explicit and Articulating Reasons are about the “use and content of 
concepts” especially as regards “the nature of language [in] . . . us rational, indeed logical, 
concept-mongering creatures” (and since the latter is the shorter, condensed version of the two, 
most of my references are to Articulating Reasons).
47
 Moreover, in the Introduction to 
Articulating Reasons, Brandom lays his cards on the table, showing where he stands on nine 
philosophical issues that bear on his inferentialism. The Introduction makes clear his 
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disingenuous position on animal minds, and by looking at the first five methodological stances, I 
hope to pinpoint where his theory could be altered so as to create a space for animals as distinct 
from artifacts.  
His first foundational philosophical position, siding with “differentiation” over 
“assimilation” (prioritizing “discontinuities between discursive and nondiscursive creatures”) 
bears most directly on the topic at hand.
48
 Brandom is not just showing his differential approach 
towards “creatures”; already—on page 2—he is showing his indifference towards nonhuman 
animals by assimilating them with artifacts: “the judgments and actions of concept users, on the 
one hand, and the uptake of environmental information and instrumental interventions of non-
concept-using organisms and artifacts, on the other.”
49
 The crux of this assimilation of animals 
and artifacts is that Brandom opposes them both as non-concept-using to humans, who are, by 
definition, concept-using. 
The implicit reason for rejecting conceptual ability in animals lies in Brandom’s second 
stance as a pragmatic functionalist, rather than a “platonist.” The “platonist,” here, is one who 
explains the “use of concepts in terms of a prior understanding of conceptual content”; Brandom, 
however, “seeks to explain how the use of linguistic expressions, or the functional role of 
intentional states, confers conceptual content on them.”
50
 The platonist would consider what 
conceptual content might or must be and then locate it, presumably by degree, in higher- and 
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lower-order animals. For Brandom, however, our unique ability to make “explicit propositions or 
principles form the direction of what is implicit in practices” indicates, or rather consists in, our 
unique capacity to have, through participation, (linguistic) conceptions of reality, and defines us 
as sapient creatures.
51
 According to Brandom, one’s conception of reality (as concepts) is an all 
or nothing game. 
Animals and artifacts don’t have conceptions of the world, according to Brandom, 
because they do not have language as such, they only have “a primitive kind of practical taking 
of something as something.”
52
 For Brandom, neither the mind nor language is the locus of 
intentionality—his third philosophical position. “Concepts are applied in the realm of language 
by the public use of sentences and other linguistic expressions,” says Brandom, “[and] are 
applied in the realm of mind by the private adoption of and rational reliance on beliefs and other 
intentional states.”
53
 Since animals don’t have a public language, and “concept use is not 
intelligible in a context that does not include language use,” then they can’t have beliefs and 
intentional states.
54
 Even “[o]ur mammalian cousins, primate ancestors, and neonatal offspring,” 
though “sentient and purposive but not discursive creatures,” don’t have concepts and intentional 
states.
55
 We may interpret them derivatively as having intentionality, but they do not. If our 
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infants and evolutionary forefathers can’t make implicit inferences, then certainly there’s no 
room for animal intentionality.  
The denial of intentional states with external language in animals corresponds with 
Brandom’s fourth preference for expression over representation as the genus of concepts. The 
project of “representation,” contra Brandom’s project, assumes that “simpler forms of 
[representation] are exhibited already in the activity of non-concept-using creatures, and on that 
basis elaborate ever more complex forms until one reaches something recognizable as 
specifically conceptual representation.”
56
 For Brandom, however, expressions (“making explicit 
what is implicit”) and concepts are necessarily related.
57
 The assumption, again, is that only 
humans can do this unique thing, namely “turning something we can initially only do into 
something we can say: codifying some sort of knowing how in the form of knowing that.”
58
 
(“Initially” seems to apply to pre-linguistic humans, i.e. infants, not evolutionarily pre-human 
animals, e.g. orangutans.) 
The fifth stance, viewing the conceptual as inferential, not intentional, is a major fulcrum 
of Brandom’s theory and, perhaps equally so, of my criticism. (Accordingly, this is the last of the 
nine stances I will discuss, the other four being less pertinent.) He says, “[W]hat distinguishes 
specifically discursive practices from the doings of non-concept-using creatures is their 
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inferential articulation. To talk about concepts is to talk about roles in reasoning.”
59
 Key to 
Brandom’s inferentialism is that  
it understands expressing something, making it explicit, as putting it in a form in 
which it can serve as and stand in need of reasons: a form in which it can serve as 
both premise and conclusion in inferences. Saying or thinking that things are 





Brandom’s inferentialism, therefore, encapsulates his “constitutive, pragmatist, relationally 
linguistic, conceptual expressivism” that differentiates humans from animals and artifacts (9). 
My criticism is that Brandom unjustly ignores the difference between animals and 
artifacts by ignoring the minimum (though profound) similarity between humans and animals as 
living creatures. He fails by his own account:  
Of course, wherever the story starts [assimilation or differentiation of the 
conceptual], it will need to account both for the ways in which concept use is like 
the comportments of non-discursive creatures and the ways in which it differs. 
Theories that assimilate conceptually structured activity to the nonconceptual 
activity out of which it arises . . . are in danger of failing to make enough of the 
difference. Theories that adopt the converse strategy [differentiation] . . . court the 




Brandom simply does not do justice to the generic similarities of humans and animals, thereby 
trivializing what distinguishes animals from mere things.  
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Differentiating Animals from Artifacts 
In a rare and all too brief section of Articulating Reasons, Brandom distinguishes animals 
from artifacts: 
Sentience is what we share with nonverbal animals such as cats—the capacity to 
be aware in the sense of being awake. Sentience, which so far as our 
understanding yet reaches is an exclusively biological phenomenon, is in turn to 
be distinguished from the mere reliable differential responsiveness we sentients 
share with artifacts such as thermostats and land mines. Sapience, by contrast, 




According to Brandom, the pigeon and the thermostat are alike in their ability to reliably respond 
to stimuli, only pigeons do this biologically and thermostats mechanically. I’m afraid that would 
be Descartes’ position as well. 
But even if animals have no mind similar to humans (no sapience), the reduction of 
animals to mechanical operations implies the difference between animals and artifacts: what is 
amazing about a dog performing a trick is that it is performing a trick, that it is trained; the 
specialness of dog training as opposed to computer programming is made apparent when the dog 
gets confused and messes up. Machines don’t get nervous or distracted by crowds of people; they 
don’t suddenly become more interested in an observer’s hat or shoe than in their master’s voice 
or treat. That is, the ability to mechanize animals (imperfectly) only reveals the fact that they are 
not machines. 
Consider this typical, inhumane comparison of a thermometer and a parrot: “The 
difference between a tape-triggering thermometer or a parrot trained to utter ‘It’s getting 
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warmer’ when exposed to suitable changes of temperature and the human observer’s . . . lies . . . 
in the understanding of the classificatory significance attributed to those responses,” i.e., lies in 
the human’s understanding of the meaning of “it’s getting warmer” and the 
thermometer/animal’s lack of understanding.
63
  
Now let us conceive of the situation differently and see how Brandom’s conclusions fare. 
Let’s keep the thermometer and the human observer from off the street, but instead of a parrot 
let’s use a foreigner who can’t speak the native tongue, but whom we taught to successfully 
announce when “it’s getting warmer” without teaching her what the words mean.  
That “the [American] observer does and the instrument does not grasp or attribute such a 
signification to its own response” still is true in the adapted situation, but what about with the 
foreign observer?
64
 Are we to assume that even though she doesn’t have the linguistic analogues 
to “it’s getting warmer,” she wouldn’t (or couldn’t) grasp the implicit meaning of her response to 
stimuli, namely that it’s getting warmer?  
I think it is fair to assume that, given human intellect, humans can understand implicit 
meanings even without any ability to make explicit (in the English language, for example) what 
they understand implicitly. That is, the foreigner would understand that it is getting warmer, and 
that getting warmer corresponds to the sounds “ ts g t t ng wôrm r”; she would be able to 
understand the semantic correspondence to the stimulus no matter whether she were trained to 
say “es wird wärmer” or “plank slab block.” We know this because, as Brandom points out, 
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humans can understand inferences theoretically. If we grant that animals can’t understand 
theoretical inferences, on what grounds besides presumption does Brandom assert that animals 
have no more implicit understanding of practical inferences than artifacts such as thermometers 
do? Mark Okrent is able to give a compelling account of animal rationality grounded in teleology 
while still maintaining a unique kind of linguistic rationality in humans (grounded in their self-
determining teleology). That is, even if Brandom is right to assert that humans alone can perform 
theoretical inferences, Okrent shows again and again how animals perform what can only be 
called practical inferences. 
Okrent works off Donald Griffin’s description of the plover bird’s “broken wing 
display,”
65
 a creatively variable defense mechanism used by other bird species as well, and 
perhaps also by fish.
66
 The plover feigns injury to distract predators away from the bird’s nest, 
but not in a programmatic way; rather, the bird behaves in a richly versatile way, adapting to the 
changing situation, taking into consideration, so to speak, variable environmental factors and 
actions of the predator, what Michael Wheeler might call flexible, adaptive richness.
67
 Of note to 
Okrent is that the bird isn’t merely responding to given stimuli according to biological 
programming (if you will) or innate goals, as lower-order animals do. The Sphex wasp, for 
instance, displays a kind of rationality that adapts to changes in its environment, but it adapts in a 
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predictable, systematic way when an experimenter moves the food for its eggs, a caterpillar, as 
the wasp checks the burrow before adding the caterpillar.
68
 Okrent comments,  
What the plover does is more versatile and adaptive than what the wasp does in a 
wider range of circumstances. The plover can deal with the presence of 
experimental intervention [of a scientist] far more effectively than the wasp can, 
for example. And the plover is far more capable of adjusting her behavior in light 
of what seems to be a recognition of the failure of a previous behavior to achieve 
its proximate end than is the wasp. You won’t find a plover endlessly repeating a 
failed subroutine in the way that the wasp in the example does. For those reasons, 




By more rational, Okrent means that lower-order animals only have an instrumental rationality 
(teleology), whereas higher-order animals act according to goals that are determined by their 
rational beliefs and desires (though they lack mental awareness of intentionality). Okrent’s 
contention that higher-order animals act on (non-conscious) intentionality is a stronger claim 
than I am making, that animals make practical inferences.  Okrent shows that animals act 
according to the general principles of their teleology (innate goals), and in ways that are 
“flexible, versatile, and appropriate in novel ways” (intentionality),
70
 and this intentional 
teleology fits—if not exceeds—Brandom’s description of the “intrinsically motivating 
preferences or desires” of practical inferences and rational action,
71
 thus showing that practical 
inferences are prior to, or at least separable from, theoretical inferences.  
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Therefore, to return to the thermometer parrot story, the parrot is more like a foreigner 
than a thermometer in saying that it’s getting warmer, for they are both recognizing and acting 
upon a desired goal, a practical inference, as opposed to the thermometer which simply responds 
to “merely external factors,” as Okrent would put it.
72
 Though neither the parrot nor the foreigner 
understands the semantics of the English language, they both recognize the inference that when it 
gets warmer, they say “it’s getting warmer,” whereas the thermometer can’t make practical 
inferences. Thus, rather than showing animals as reducible to biological machines, Brandom’s 
example actually highlights the similarities of humans and animals as distinct from artifacts. 
 
Synthesizing Animal Implicit and Human Explicit Understanding  
Although Brandom’s anti-animal rhetoric in Making It Explicit and Articulating Reasons 
pervades his very system of inferentialism, the task of creating a space in his theory for animals 
to make implicit inferences may be easier than it seems. In fact, an earlier work of his gives us a 
rubric for incorporating animal inferences into his schema.  
Brandom’s 1985 “Varieties of Understanding” delves into familiar categories of 
understanding, “that which remains implicit in practice, and that which becomes explicit in 
principles.”
73
 Of course, Brandom is interested in “the sophisticated kind of understanding which 
is explicitly instituted, codified, and communicated in the form of explications” (which are 
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ultimately founded upon implicit practice), but he rather candidly (for him) affirms implicit 
inferences apart from (not merely prior to) explicit understanding, albeit somewhat 
condescendingly: “Students of animal learning are concerned with the simple kind of 
understanding which is implicit in the skilled practice of prelinguistic performers whose behavior 
must be treated as regular rather than rule governed.”
74
 In contrast with his recent work which 
emphasizes a differentialist approach to rationality, here Brandom the “pragmatist emphasizes 
the continuity of human understanding with animal understanding . . . by contrast to the 
platonist’s emphasis on the discontinuities marked by animals’ incapacity to act according to 
explicit principles.”
75
 Let us discuss his pragmatist approach here before reconciling it with his 
later, more platonic approach. 
The first move of the pragmatist “is to try to explain understanding that something is the 
case . . . in terms of understanding how to do something, and further to understand understanding 
. . . simply as being able to do something, to perform appropriately according to some 
practice.”
76
 Implicit inferences involve doing the appropriate things appropriately—a cat waiting 
for a mouse, a man shooing a fly. While this is prelinguistic, I don’t see why it mustn’t include 
rationality, broadly construed, perhaps even what we call phronesis.
77
 We needn’t attribute 









 Indeed, Aristotle and Aquinas attribute phronesis to some animals and humans. See 
MacIntyre, 5-6. Sorabji, however, believes that the denying of logos and doxa and the expansion 








beliefs and desires, as Mark Okrent does, to quasi-rational animals to admit some form of 
rationality to animals. Simply put, higher-order animals seem to display flexible and adaptive 
goal-directed behavior, what I want to call phronesis, much like we do—but this does not 
obviate the extreme gap between such shared phronesis and the uniquely human rationality of 
self-reflection, anxiety, soul, conscience, Dasein, or, as Brandom would have it, the explanatory 
understanding involved in making inferences explicit. 
Brandom continues: “to describe the form of such an account [of explicit understanding],” 
however, “is not to offer an account of explicit understanding.”
78
 Even if we can give an account of a 
broken-wing display performing bird in terms of beliefs and desires (as Okrent does), our description 
does not imply such explicit understanding in the bird (as Okrent rightly points out).
79
 That is, even if 
the bird is reasoning (adapting to unique situations with unique goals), it is, for all we know, not 
reasoning in a reflective way (“If I do such and such maybe—I hope!—such and such will happen”); 
rather, it is reasoning only on the implicit level (as we do when we judge whether to scoot our seat 
forward or back when sitting). When we hail a taxi, it involves some kind of thought or desire (a taxi) 
and requisite action (signaling), but this thought and action isn’t reflective (“I find myself wanting a 
taxi”); just so with animals—actions, rationality, desires, or what have you, are reflexive, but not 
self-reflexive. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
of animal minds in the West; phronesis is not enough, for  the denial of reason necessitates an 
expansion of perception in order to account for what animals do; Aquinas’s vis aestimativa 












What distinguishes humans is the ability to make explicit such implicit desires, reasons, 
etc.—“inferences,” according to Brandom—in an explanatory gesture. Animals, however, can’t 
explain to themselves or to us how something is, only that something is. This “expliciting,” 
according to Brandom, goes hand in hand with “impliciting”; but if animals can’t “explicit,” how 
do they “implicit” inferences? The later Brandom seems unable to leave room in his philosophy 
for animals to be able to make implicit inferences, and so lumps the animals with the artifacts. 
Nonetheless, I contend that we can redeem Brandom’s later two-sides-of-the-coin approach to 
inferences by appealing to his earlier account of understanding, and so rescue animals from the 
ghetto of Cartesian objects.  
We can allow for animals to have implicit inferences but not the ability to make such 
inferences explicit, without rejecting the two-sided coin account of inferences, if we allow 
humans to make explicit animal inferences on their behalf. In order to “turn [implicit inferences] 
into an [explicit] account one must at least be prepared to offer a pragmatist story about how to 
build explicit understanding as codified in principles out of forms of understanding which are 
merely implicit, manifesting themselves only in appropriate practice and not in such 
principles.”
80
 Such an explication, however, cannot be mere description, as noted above. For 
example, such an explication cannot merely appeal to evolutionary biology or behaviorism. We 
need a story that goes beyond mere description or ascription, and we will attempt that in the 
following chapters.  
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LOCATING THE PROBLEM WITHIN BRANDOM’S APPROPRIATION OF HEIDEGGER 
 
  
Commonly the arguments run something like this. Some particular capacity is 
made the object of enquiry….And it is then shown how, contrary to the views of 
some philosophical predecessor, the human exercise of this particular capacity 
involves the possession and use of language. It is finally further concluded that, 
because nonhuman animals do not possess language, or at least the requisite kind 






Finding out how Brandom appropriates Heidegger into his philosophy is a rather easy 
task, for he discusses Heidegger in relation to his work explicitly in his book, Tales of the Mighty 
Dead. Tales is a “historical” presentation of Brandom’s philosophy, whereas his other works—
he mentions specifically Making It Explicit and Articulating Reasons—have been of a more 
systematic nature.
82
 Brandom’s heroes are, as he puts it, a “motley group,” but they are also not 
unsurprising: Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Frege, Heidegger, and Sellars.
83
 He has an essay or two 
on each thinker besides three introductory chapters. The three chapters form Part One, which 
stands alone as a discussion of the tradition generally, and in the brief Heidegger section of 
Chapter 2 we can see how Brandom’s appropriation of Heidegger goes awry.  
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Brandom’s Inferentialist Reading of Zu- and Vorhandenheit  
Brandom seems to think, perhaps rightly, that Heidegger’s most important contribution to 
philosophy is the ontological distinction between Zu- and Vorhandenheit. Unfortunately, 
Brandom manipulates the terms so that while maintaining their basic meaning, he trivializes the 
primacy of Zuhandenheit by making the two mutually dependent. This, I will argue, explains 
why Brandom cannot account for animal minds whereas an orthodox take on Heidegger’s Zu- 
and Vorhandenheit can.  
 Brandom reads Heidegger as a pragmatist, which is an understandable (even if not a 
desirable) reading, and I don’t think Brandom’s pragmatism directly sets him up for failure with 
animal minds. Prima facie, Brandom’s description of the pragmatist project, “to explain knowing 
that in terms of knowing how,” looks to line up quite nicely with Vor- and Zuhandenheit, the 
ontology of a thing as an item of inquiry and as an item in use.
84
 I believe that Brandom’s 
pragmatism and Heidegger’s Vorhandenheit/Zuhandenheit ontology can match up in an 
interesting way, but not as Brandom develops it.  
Similarly, and more importantly, Brandom reads inferentialism into Heidegger. He reads 
Vorhandenheit as “high-end intentionality” and Zuhandenheit as “a kind of preconceptual 
intentionality.”
85
 I believe we can understand inferentialism in terms of Vor- and Zuhandenheit, 
and indeed we ought to, but the way Brandom develops the connection fails, particularly in 
regards to animal minds as I shall argue. 
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A Review of Heidegger’s Zu- and Vorhandenheit 
Let us begin by rehashing briefly the genius of Heidegger’s zu – and vorhanden 
ontological distinction. Heidegger’s insight is that we do not think of a hammer objectively (as 
an object of inquiry) while using it to hammer. That is, much of our interaction with the world is 
direct, such as sitting in a chair or catching ourselves as we trip over something. Abstract thought 
does not come into play in such operations unless the hammer or chair breaks. Only then is the 
object viewed as something foreign or alien to us, whereas before the hammer was an extension 
of us for doing a certain type of thing, and the chair a means for us to extend ourselves in a 
certain way. That is, the hammer is not some object which we first consider abstractly as 
weighing so much and having such a shape, which then gives it the property of being a hammer. 
Objects don’t have usability or equipmentality added to them, since we engage with items of 
gear prior to or without considering them as objects of study. The opposite is not so: we cannot 
view things objectively without any reference to use. Every objective quality is a quality in 
reference to its function, its place in the world. There is no purely objective object of 
contemplation; even if there were, let’s say the Good, its singular value (at least to us) would still 
place it in our world even if we admit that it is beyond being, beyond our world.  
Thus we learn two things from Heidegger’s insight: (1) zuhanden equipmentality is more 
originary ontology that (2) grounds the vorhanden ontology of things as objects. The third 
insight—the real upshot, perhaps, of this line of thought—is that meaning (or a part of meaning), 
the more originary kind of meaning, is a meaning of doing, of use. The word “screwdriver” 
doesn’t just mean some vorhanden definition found in a dictionary; on a deeper level, 








a thing meant for hammering, that is, a thing for banging another thing with, especially if that 
other thing is a nail. A forth derivative point is that there is a network of Zuhandenheit. We are 
well aware of the network of signs and symbols made famous by the poststructuralists, but 
Heidegger reveals a more originary web of zuhanden things: hammering implies nails and wood, 
which implies building, which implies buildings, dwellings, where we dwell, live, living, life, the 
world, etc.  
 
Brandom’s Appropriation of Zu- and Vorhandenheit 
Now it should be obvious, even if unwelcome to the orthodox Heideggerian, why 
Brandom is so fond of Zu- and Vorhandenheit: he sees a pragmatic doing x as grounding the 
meaning of that x, and he sees the implicit inferences as grounding the explicit inferences (the 
pragmatic as grounding the abstract inferences). As Brandom puts it, 
our practical nonconceptual dealings with things that form the necessary 
background for understanding how it is possible for us to achieve the disinterested 
representational perspective from which we judge or state how things 
are…Vorhandensein is precipitated out of Zuhandensein—…the capacity to say 





So far so good, but here Brandom departs from Heidegger in a way that prevents the 
possibility of animal minds. Vorhandenheit, as Brandom notes, is the realm of language, of 
giving and asking for reasons. Animals lack this ability to operate in a public space of linguistic 
rationality, and so, if they are to have any kind of mind or world, it must be confined to the realm 
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of Zuhandenheit (if that term can be transferred to whatever animals do). I contest that minimally 
we may infer that animals make implicit inferences, which is to say that they operate according 
to Zuhandenheit (though not in the rich sense of Dasein whose Zuhandenheit is informed by 
Vorhandenheit, as in the learning to drive stick shift); that is, I contest that if Brandom didn’t go 
beyond Heidegger on this point, he would have a place for animal minds in his philosophy. But 
Brandom explicitly rejects any Zuhandenheit apart from Vorhandenheit, and thus any space for 
animal minds: 
At this point it is tempting to see the world of equipment as autonomous, as 
something that could be in place before, or otherwise in the absence of the 
particular linguistic practices…. If that is right, then Heidegger is putting forward 
a ‘layer cake’ picture of the relation between the two sorts of intentionality. …But 




Brandom believes that, contra Heidegger, Zuhandenheit is reciprocally dependent on 
Vorhandenheit: 
one might take it as a lesson of natural science that Zuhandensein is also reference 
dependent on Vorhandensein: unless there were objective facts stateable in 
assertions, there could not be any social practices at all. Since assertions…are a 
special kind of equipment, it is obvious that nothing can show up to us as 




Brandom is asserting that social practice, a kind of Zuhandensein, is only possible if there are 
things to be social about, namely a world in which to practice. But this is not a valid dismissal of 
the primacy of Zuhandensein—as Brandom pointed out on the previous page: “We will not say 
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that before we had the concepts there was no mass, no electrons, and so on.”
89
 What then is 
Brandom getting at? In Chapter 11, he explicitly says that Vorhandenheit is necessary, because 
otherwise “this account can be told about pre- or nonlinguistic creatures [animals], as 
exemplifying an autonomous level of functioning on which the capacity for linguistic practice is 
causally and conceptually parasitic.”
90
 Brandom recognizes that Heidegger’s prioritizing of 
Zuhandenheit allows for animals to similarly engage the world in a fundamental way; for 
Brandom, this is parasitic—no pun intended, I’m sure. Because Brandom refuses to allow for 
animals to have rich, zuhanden engagement with the world, he makes Zu- and Vorhandenheit 
reciprocally dependent, though Zuhandenheit remains the “first among equals” since 
Zuhandensein links up with Mitdasein, another constitutive aspect of Dasein.
91
 
Brandom argues that Heidegger must be committed to the reciprocal structure of, as he 
puts it, implicit and explicit inferences, and indeed, at least in Being and Time, it appears that 
Heidegger is very much committed to this reciprocal structure. Heidegger interprets the Greek 
λόγος as “Rede,” which is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as “discourse” or “talk,” as 
distinct from  “Sprache” (“language”) and from “Gerede” (“idle talk”). Thus “Dasein, man’s 
Being, is ‘defined’ as the ζώον λόγον έχον—as that living thing whose Being is essentially 
determined by the potentiality for discourse.”
92
 Heidegger is able to make this connection 
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because λόγος, which refers to the man’s distinctive faculty of reason (Vernunft), shares the same 
root as λέγειν, which means “to hold discourse,” or more generally, “laying out, exhibiting, 
setting forth, recounting, telling a tale, making a statement.”
93
 Λογος, Heidegger notes, is also 
tied to λεγόμενον: 
Moreover, λόγος can signify the reason [Vernunft]. And because, moreover, λόγος 
is used not only with the signification of λέγειν  but also with that of λεγόμενον 
(that which is exhibited, as such), and because the latter is nothing else than the 
‘υποκείμενον which, as present-at-hand, already lies at the bottom [zum Grunde] 
of any procedure of addressing oneself to it or discussing it, λόγος qua λεγόμενον 
means the ground, the ratio…visible in its relation to something in its 




Heidegger thus weds discourse and present-at-hand etymologically as a relationship unified in 
reason. The present-at-hand grounds discourse but not, apparently, in the sensing of founding, 
but in the sense of grounding, of Grund; the relationship between present-at-hand and discourse 
isn’t causal or temporal but coeval. As Brandom would put it, reason is the relationship between 
the implicit and the explicit, the ability to make explicit implicit truth. 
 Lest we miss the connection of language (discourse) to mind in Heidegger, which is so 
troubling in Brandom, we must remember that “Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with 
state-of-mind and understanding.”
95
 However, Heidegger follows this sentence with a stronger 
claim, something seemingly opposite of what I am arguing in my thesis as a whole. Heidegger 
seems to make “expliciting” (Brandom’s word) prior to any implicit truth (e.g. that math only 
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has meaning or truth once Dasein makes it explicit): “The intelligibility of something has always 
been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the 
Articulation of intelligibility.”
96
 This is made clearer in the lecture course that culminated in 
Being and Time. Heidegger says that   
It is also a matter of fact that our simplest perception and constitutive states are 
already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way. What is primary 
and original here? It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather 
that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, 




This characterization in The History of the Concept of Time shows that in perception, discourse 
precedes perception for Dasein. Of course Being and Time is famously only an investigation of 
the being that asks about Being; it is not an investigation of Being itself, but only inasmuch it’s 
related to Dasein. This existential aspect of Being and Time seems to be lost on Brandom who 
universalizes the relationship between discourse and present-at-hand truth. What a more careful 
reading of Paragraph 34 shows is that it is only (as far as we know) true of Dasein that the 
explicit and the implicit are reciprocally related. If we don’t take a superficial reading of 
Heidegger, we see that Dasein shares with animals an originary connection to the world, which 
we’ll discuss in the next chapter. 
 
 





 Heidegger, Martin. History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel 









HEIDEGGER’S SNAIL AND OTHER (WORLD-)POOR ANIMALS 
 
 
Because plants and animals are lodged in their respective 
environments but are never placed freely in the clearing of being 
which alone is “world,” they lack language. But in being denied 







Some philosophers like Descartes and, more recently Robert Brandom, brilliant as they 
may be, seem entirely indifferent towards animals, as if animals in their own right are nothing 
but our playthings or nature’s wild machines. On the other extreme, of course, are those from 
Pythagoras to Peter Singer who insist that the way we humans view each other, namely our 
ethical obligations towards one another, applies also to animals. Traditionally, the proper view of 
animals lies in the middle: we don’t have moral obligations of the same kind towards animals 
(and it’s certainly not reciprocal), but that does not make us indifferent towards them. The moral 
mean, then, does not underestimate what distinguishes man from beast, nor does it underestimate 
their commonalities. The early Heidegger’s topology of beings follows this traditional schema.  
Even within the traditional centrist position, however, people tend to gravitate towards 
the extremes of similarity and difference. What one takes as an example of “animal” usually 
betrays this bias. David Farrell Krell, for instance, is fond of discussing horses vis-à-vis 
Dasein—horses, those enlightened creatures that make us look like yahoos, are a domesticated 
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animal, and their features are inevitably cast in the shadow of man (be it through evolutionary 
history, cultural history, military history, etc.).
99
 Krell doesn’t talk about the whiteness of the 
whale or of the tyger tyger, burning bright. Of course, poets have their own aesthetic reasons for 
choosing the animals they do in their works. Philosophers, however, must choose their examples 
for—shall we say—metaphysical reasons. Indeed, Heidegger’s most explicit examples of 
animals as animals are the lizard and the bee in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. 
The lizard and the bee are a far cry from the horses of Krell or the popular examples of 
“my dog,”
100
 much to Krell’s chagrin. However, Heidegger’s more exotic and yet more common 
example of an animal in his early work, is, I shall argue, more interesting and more insightful—
he chooses that pest, that delicacy, that alien of an animal, the snail.
101
 In this chapter we will 
also discuss Heidegger’s (world-)poor animals, the lizard and the bee. Necessarily, we will at the 
same time clarify what it is to be Dasein. Both we and the animal interact and engage directly 
with the world, but just what this world is or means to us and the animal remains to be seen.  
Let us begin with the concept of a world, and then progress to the lizards and the bees of 
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. The lynchpin of the discussion, however, will come 
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at the end when we see the intimate connection between Dasein and the snail through a close 
reading of The History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. 
 
The World (Not as Will or Representation—or Materialism) 
There are two extremes of world that Heidegger is explicitly working against which can 
be summed up as a parody of Schopenhauer’s magnum opus (also very much opposed by 
Heidegger): the world is not a place of vitalism or mystical dynamism, either in the sense of 
romantics like Schopenhauer and the early Nietzsche, or in the sense of psychological or egoistic 
individualism in vogue during Heidegger’s time, especially that of Husserl and Scheler; neither 
is the world a representation of our minds or of a mind, as diverse people have thought from 
Plato and Augustine to Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant. Neither does Heidegger think that a 
scientific materialism can get anywhere close to the truth of things. He thus refuses to play the 
game of idealism or realism (pick your poison), and calls the bluff: we are already beings-in-the-
world (something idealism overlooks),
102
 and we are beings who ask after being (something 
scientific realism can’t account for). Instead of these flawed categories, Heidegger thinks of our 
interaction in the world in terms of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, in terms of a direct, handy 
engagement with the world and in terms of an abstract, present-at-hand (dis)engagement with the 
world.  
Such an analysis of our being-in-the-world, though profound, leaves unanswered the 
question of the world as world, the world in which we have our being, the world that worlds. 
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Heidegger attempts to understand world three times and in three different ways in his early work 
(and continues to try in his later work): first in Being and Time, then in “On the Essence of 
Grounds,” and then in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. For our purposes, it will 
suffice to discuss world as Heidegger presents it in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.  
 
The World of Phusis through Logos  
One way of thinking about the world is as nature, as the natural world. By this we do not 
mean the world as described by the natural sciences, the material world, so to speak. Rather by 
world Heidegger means phusis in the rich sense of the ancient Greeks, of “growing, growth, that 
which has itself grown in such growth”; “Growing is all this taken together as one.”
103
 Phusis is 
the “self-forming prevailing of beings as a whole.”
104
 The world is thus an unfolding of being(s). 
But there is a more specific form of world that is particular to Dasein, namely the world 
that he forms. Dasein is thus not merely a part of the world: Dasein has and makes a world; 
Dasein partitions and partakes in world-forming.  
[M]an is not simply regarded as a part of the world within which he appears and 
which he makes up a part [as with animals]. Man also stands over against the 
world. This standing-over-against is a ‘having’ of world as that in which man 
moves, with which he engages, which he both masters and serves, and to which 
he is exposed. Thus man is, first, a part of the world, and second, as this part he is 
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The way that Dasein forms a world is tied to his having logos. Logos, generally translated as 
reason, is linked etymologically to logein, “speaking.” Thus for Heidegger, logos is primarily a 
speaking out, a making it explicit in discourse. The “it” here is phusis: “Man, insofar as he exists 
as man, has always already spoken out about phusis.”
106
   
There is a close relationship between phusis and logos, between world and discursive 
world-forming, and thus a special relationship between Dasein and the world: “Phusis means this 
whole prevailing that prevails through man himself, a prevailing that he does not have power 
over, but which precisely prevails through and around him—him, man, who has always already 
spoken out about this.”
107
 Dasein is the being that speaks the world, who uncovers the world. 
Thus we arrive at Heidegger’s definition of truth: a-letheia, un-concealing. Animals don’t have 
the ability to make the world explicit. Therefore animals do not have a world (as Dasein does), 
though this does not mean they are utterly worldless (like a stone); they have some kind of 
world, and so Heidegger settles on calling them “world-poor,” “Weltarmut.” We have the 
following formation, which we’ll discuss in the next section: “[T]he stone (material object) is 
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The Lizards and the Bees—(World-)Poor Animals! 
Animals are not simply world-less, as is the case with stones, for certainly animals 
engage the world in a way that rocks cannot (though some, like Descartes and Brandom, seem to 
miss the import of this phenomenological fact). There is a distinction between worldlessness of a 
stone and an animal’s poverty of world: “the stone cannot even be deprived of something like a 
world.”
109
 A stone is not like a lizard on a stone, just as a lizard lying on a stone is not like a 
hand on a head.
110
 That is, material things are as different from animals as animals are from 
Dasein. Stones simply don’t have access to beings as beings, and this is how Heidegger wants us 
to understand the world in its minimal, “poor” sense, as “the accessibility of beings.”
111
 Stones 
have no access to beings, let alone being; stones do not engage phusis, let alone make phusis 
known through logos. 
Animals are more than stones in that that they engage other beings in the world. As we’ll 
see in the next section, this engagement is a minimal kind of Zuhandenheit, but already we can 
see how animals relate to the world directly. The lizard, for instance, “has sought out this stone” 
in order to bask in the sun.
112
 Though we must be careful how we go about this, we are not 
projecting anything when we recognize a kind of intentionality here, a directedness-towards, an 
in-order-to:  
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Every animal as animal has a specific set of relationships to its sources of 
nourishment, its prey, its enemies, its sexual mates, and so on. These 
relationships, which are infinitely difficult for us to grasp and require a high 
degree of caution and methodological foresight on our part, have a peculiar 
fundamental character of their own, the metaphysical significance of which has 




Animals even have a kind of automatic engagement with the world, akin to das Man, in their (at 
times) unnoticing engagement with their world.
114
  
 Simpler animals like the bee also have a kind of (impoverished) world, full of intimate 
relationships with other beings. Indeed, even “A very primitive unicellular form of life…will 
already find itself, where this disposition can be the greatest and darkest dullness, but for all that 
it is in its structure of being essentially distinct from merely being on hand like a [strictly 
material] thing.”
115
 Unlike most thinkers who discuss animals with a bias towards higher order 
animals, preferencing animals with high intelligence or the ability to feel pain, Heidegger bites 
the bullet and means by animal all animals. Indeed, his inclusion of unicellular life forms as 
animals indicates why he includes plants under the category of life and why he often mentions 
the two in the same sentence, seemingly indiscriminately. Thus, we may also include plants in 
the following sentence: “The animal’s way of being, which we call ‘life’, is not without access to 
what is around it and about it [noch neben ihm ist],” though this access may be severely limited, 
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especially for plants and unicellular organisms.
116
 Indeed, this limited access, this confinement, 
as he calls it, indicates the poverty of world for animals. That we can liken animals to plants 
shows how poor their world is. But we can be more precise than this. 
 Although animals experience the world, they do not experience the world as world.  
This is Heidegger’s central point in his discussion of animals in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics:  
The bee, for example, has its hive, its cells, the blossoms it seeks out, and the 
other bees of the swarm. The bee’s world is limited to a specific domain and is 
strictly circumscribed….But it is not merely the world of each particular animal 
that is limited in range—the extent and manner in which an animal is able to 
penetrate whatever is accessible to it is also limited. The worker bee is familiar 
with the blossoms it frequents, along with their colour and scent, yet it does not 





Poor in world means deprived of world. Animals are thus infinitely removed from humans, not 
just in the range of our possible experiences (the what), but, more essentially, in the very 
possibility of experiencing the world as world (the how).  
As against this [animal poverty of world], the world of man is a rich one, 
…constantly extendable not only in range…but also in respect to the manner in 
which we can penetrate ever more deeply in this penetrability. Consequently we 
can characterize the relation man possesses to the world by referring to the 





                                                 
 
116
 Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 198 (292). 
117










We have now seen how Heidegger distinguishes the world-forming man, Dasein, from 
the world-poor animals. What remains for us is to look at animals from the other perspective, to 
see how much of the world and our way of relating to it is shared with animals.  
 
The Shared Zuhanden World  
If Heidegger uses the bees and lizards to differentiate man from beast, then in the 
Prolegomena he uses the snail to showcase what links Dasein and other animals. Heidegger uses 
the snail as an example of how we are already in the world: just like the snail in its shell is 
already in the world, so too, even if we could crawl into our minds, our minds would still be in 
the world. (The world is not in our consciousness, as Husserl would put it; our consciousness is 
in the world.) The snail analogy, as we shall see, is no mere analogy, but a telling account of 
animal-being in the world.
119
 But first a word on the vocabulary of Prolegomena. 
 
The Vocabulary of the Prolegomena 
In the lectures that would become Being and Time, Heidegger’s approach is quite 
different: he begins with a long discussion and criticism of Husserl (and other phenomenologists) 
before getting to the material that would make up the bulk of Being and Time. While this 
phenomenological approach, rather than the more existentially oriented approach of Being and 
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Time, is helpful for realizing Heidegger’s debt to Husserl, for our purposes it portrays the now 
familiar insights of Being and Time in a different light that enables us to see crucial Heideggerian 
concepts for what they are, that is, apart from any stale interpretations or understandings that 
may have become entrenched in our minds or even in the literature.  
One striking divergence from Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation is that Theodore 
Kisiel translates zuhanden as “handy” (not “ready-to-hand”) and vorhanden primarily as “on 
hand” (not “present-at-hand”). Vorhandenheit as “on hand” reads remarkably different than 
“present-at-hand” would in the text—it sounds almost zuhanden, and this, it would seem, is 
intentional. Although the Prolegomena is the first place Heidegger clearly distinguishes 
Zuhandenes from Vorhandenes,
120
 the distinction is still fluid enough that the use of 
Vorhandenheit often sounds handy in the text, and so Kisiel is probably trying to capture this 
more immediate Vorhandenheit with his translation of it as “on hand.” (He also translates dabei 
as “on hand,” as we shall see.) Here are Kisiel’s comments on the use of Vorhandenheit leading 
up to Being and Time: 
Vorhandenheit (prepresence, on-handness, presence at hand) – First used 
terminologically to describe the “already there in advance” in which the around-
world is disclosed, and so not yet distinguished from the “handy” (GA 63:97; also 
November 1924). In fact, so unresolved is this term in November 1924 that even 
the facticity of the “I am,” its “that it is,” is described in terms of its “being on 
hand.” The more subtle analysis in SS 1925 of the levels of immediate presence 
first yields the clear distinction in modes of encounter and disclosedness between 
the handy (Zuhandenes) and the on-hand things (Vorhandenes) against the 
background presence of the environing world. 
121
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Again, although the distinction is made “clear” in the Prolegomena, Vorhandenheit 
remains relatively originary, lacking the ontological separation and dependence on Zuhandenheit 
we see in Being and Time. It is Erkennen, “knowing,” that is “a founded way of being-in-the-
world, a way that is always possible only on the basis of non-cognitive comportment.”
122
 Though 
“knowing [Erkennen] is not on hand [vorhanden]” in the Prolegomena,
123
 the role of Erkennen is 
usually what is meant by Vorhandenheit in Being and Time (or at least in traditional readings of 
Being and Time)
124
. In the Prolegomena, vorhanden has a more visceral ontology, it is on hand, 
rather than as a abstract ontology, say of chemistry or lexicography, that we see in Being and 
Time.  Nonetheless, Vorhandensein does sometimes indicate beings in a being-in relationship, as 
water is in a glass.
125
 Animals however, are not beings-in, as we shall see. 
 
In-Being: The Snail in its Haus, in its World 
Heidegger stresses “a basic constitutive state” of Dasein is “being-in-the-world” in the 
sense of being “unified” and “originary.”
126
 The first aspect of being in the world is not our focus 
here, though it is important to keep in mind that Dasein is wholly there in the world and 
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apprehends the world as a whole (there is no Cartesian separation from the world, no sub specie 
aeternitatis; the world is given as whole, and we are “in” that world as part of it holistically, not 
in terms of realism or idealism.) More to the topic at hand, Dasein’s originary position is in the 
world. This “in-being” involves being in relation to the world, to other beings in the world; we 
are “in” a space of reference. 
This spatiality is not like a “spatial container,” like “being-in” something as water is in a 
glass; rather, it is a rich sense of space as world. 
‘In’ comes from innan, which means to dwell, habitare; ‘ann’ means: I am 
accustomed, I am familiar with, I take care of something—the Latin colo in the 
sense of habito and diligo. Dwelling is also taken here as taking care of something 




Theodore Kisiel extends the translation of Sein-bei to “in intimate familiarity, being-involved-
with” for good reason, for this is precisely what Heidegger is getting at in this passage, and we 
lack a word like the French “chez” that can capture the German “bei.” And “bei” is crucial for 
our topic, as we’ll see as we continue with the text. 
This same entity which we characterize as in-being we also define, as I have 
already said, as the entity that I am [bin]; and “bin” is connected with “bei.” “I 





Here, interestingly enough, in-being is connected with dwelling in the world, in relation to other 
beings that are da-bei, beings for which we have concern. In-being is part of everydayness, it has 
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“the character of concern.”
129
 As we may have guessed, Dasein is an in-being; in fact, “In-being 




Does this mean that Dasein is the only in-being? Initially it would seem so, since 
Heidegger next links up Erkennen (“knowing”) with Dasein’s in-being: “knowing [Erkennen] the 
world is a mode of being of Dasein such that this mode is ontically founded in its basic 
constitution, in being-in the-world.”
131
 And in the larger context, Heidegger is attempting to 
show that any object-subject Erkennen is already grounded in being-in-the-world; if Erkennen is 
in mente, in some “Gehäuse” or “box,”
132
 then that box itself in the world. But to show this, 
Heidegger introduces the snail and its shell—its Gehäuse, its Haus—which links up the animal 
in-being with Dasein in-being.
133
 
 Gehäuse is the German word for the shell of snails and the like, but also of radios, 
cameras and other such things in the sense of “casing” or “box” or even “housing.” This last 
sense makes clear the word’s connection with its root, Haus. Indeed, besides an archaic use of 
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Gehäuse to mean a shelter [Behausung],
134
 Heidegger himself makes this connection explicit by 
using both Haus to mean shell and shell to mean Haus. As he begins the snail analogy, it is “[die] 
Schnecke in ihrem Haus” and then “Schneckengehäuse” in the next sentence; on the next page it 
is “Die Schnecke kriecht zuweilen aus ihrem Gehäuse,” “sie im Gehäuse ist,” “Sie ist in ihrem 
Haus,” “sie hat das Innen ihres Hauses als Welt,” and simply “im Haus.”
135
 Clearly Heidegger is 
playing off of the Haus in Gehäuse. But what for? Heidegger is emphasizing that the snail dwells 
in the world. We can see this in many ways, as I shall try to make clear. 
 Heidegger connects the snail to Dasein by saying that when it stretches out of its shell to 
get something, it “at the same time keeps it on hand” (“behält es dabei zugleich”).
136
 Just above 
in the section before (§19), Heidegger connects bei with bin, with dwelling, with in-being. The 
snail dwells in its Haus, it dwells in the world— da-bei, both there-by and here-by. The duality 
of da should recall that of da in Da-sein. Indeed, the snail, unlike the glass of water, “has the 
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mode of being of Dasein, it is such that it has a world” (“es eine Welt hat”).
137
 That we can be 
sure Heidegger means the snail here and not Dasein by analogy is made clear in the first sentence 
after this paragraph: “This [analogy] applies similarly to a subject to which knowing [Erkennen] 
is ascribed,” i.e. to an animal with knowing (properly speaking), i.e. Dasein, which means we 
have been talking about the snail specifically.
138
 The snail therefore has “a” world, though not 
knowledge (and we will return to this later).
139
 
 We’ve already mentioned but passed over too quickly another way in which we are 
meant to understand the snail as connected to Dasein inasmuch as they both have a world, in-
being, etc., namely that the snail “is not in its shell like water in the glass.”
140
 Water in a glass is 
one of Heidegger’s examples from the previous section (§19) of “being-in” as opposed to the in-
being of Dasein and (we may now add) the snail.
141
 Indeed, just as the snail stands for the 
animal, so too the water in the glass stands for the stone, the material, lifeless thing, which has no 
world, no in-being, only being-in.  
Thus we see the snail as in between the stone and Dasein, and more akin to Dasein. Its 
shell (Gehäuse), that material stone-like thing, that Korper, is kept dabei as a Haus, a dwelling 
with which it interacts. It also interacts directly with the world; indeed, is always “already-in-the-







 That the snail “will prove to have a world in not having it,” as Krell puts it, seems to miss 
how much of a world Heidegger here concedes to animals, as I hope to show. See Krell, 90. 
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 Thus we see why the analogy “is not too far removed 
from the matter at issue, inasmuch as this analogy is concerned with an entity to which we must 
likewise attribute, in a formal way, the kind of being which belongs to Dasein—‘life.’”
143
  
What then is this life? It is the “primary…non-cognitive comportment” (“primäre...nicht 
erkennden Verhattung”) towards the world.
144
 This non-cognitive apprehension (Erfassen) is 
grounded by a “letting-something-be-encountered, and this is possible only on the basis of 
always already being-involved-with” (“immer schon Seins-bei”).
145
 The connection between 
Dasein and the snail here, again, is that the snail in its shell is analogous to Dasein inside itself 
(in mente)—just as the snail crept out to get and bring back food but never really get out of itself, 
out of its shell (Gehäuse), so too Dasein doesn’t go outside itself and return with “booty” to the 
“‘housing’ [‘Gehäuse’] of consciousness.”
146
 The Gehäuse of consciousness or of the snail is 
already-in-the-world. Even in the case of consciousness, of Dasein who knows, this knowing is 
“a founded way of being-in-the-world.”
147
 “All knowing [Erkennen] is only an appropriation and 
a form of realization of something which is already discovered by other primary comportments,” 
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i.e. primary, non-cognitive comportments.
148
 Showing Dasein’s primary comportment as that of 
the animal’s is Heidegger’s motivation for the snail analogy: Dasein is an in-being, and 
Erkennen does not precede or explain its originary position in the world as an in-being; rather 
Erkennen is rooted in the primary, non-cognitive comportment to the world, the world of the 
snail. 
Erkennen, however, cannot merely be added to in-being to go from animal to Dasein.
149
 
Instead, Heidegger advocates “a phased structure” of Erkennen in which the founded forms of 
knowledge—namely, Vernehmen (perception), Wissen (knowing/understanding), and 
Wissenschaft (science) and Forschung (research)—are grounded in the “primary” forms of 
knowledge, namely “directing-itself-toward something” (“das Sichrichten-auf etwas”) and 
“dwelling-with” (“Sichaufhalten-bei”).
150
 Thus Dasein alone has Erkennen in the full sense, in 
the sense of Vernehmen, Wissen, and Forschung, but this only inasmuch as Dasein shares 
directedness-towards and dwelling-with—primary Erkennen—with the snail. 
Heidegger’s phased structure of knowledge—of animal minds—is underdeveloped in his 
work, but Mark Okrent takes up the task of fleshing out a Heideggerian structure of animal 
minds in his work, Rational Animals, to which we turn in the next chapter. 
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THINKING ANIMALS, THOUGHT-FUL HUMANS  
 
 
 [P]hilosophical theories about what it is that distinguishes 
members of our species from other animal species…may seem to 
provide grounds for the belief that our rationality as thinking 
beings is somehow independent of our animality. We become in 
consequence forgetful of our bodies and of how our thinking is the 






In this final chapter I hope to walk a narrow line: I wish to show that we can understand 
animal rationality without ascribing to them any kind of linguistic mental states while assuming 
that it is precisely language that allows us to understand how animals think. The distinction, as 
Norman Malcolm explains, is that there is an important difference between thinking and having a 
thought. Since keeping straight thinking from having thoughts is central to this chapter, it’s 
worth quoting Malcolm at length here:  
In real life we commonly employ the verb “think” in respect to animals. We say, 
“Towser thinks he is going to be fed,” just as naturally as we say, “Towser wants 
to be fed.” Suppose our dog is chasing the neighbor's cat. The latter runs full tilt 
toward an oak tree, but suddenly swerves at the last moment and disappears up a 
nearby maple. The dog doesn't see this maneuver and on arriving at the oak tree 
he rears up on his hind legs, paws the trunk as if trying to scale it, and barks 
excitedly into the branches above. We who observe the whole episode from a 
window say, “He thinks that the cat went up that oak tree.” …A million examples 
could be produced in which it would be a correct way of speaking to say of an 
animal, something of the form, “He thinks that p.” … We should, in contrast, feel 
reluctant and embarrassed to say, “He had the thought that the cat went up the oak 
tree.” In referring to an animal, it is natural enough to say, “He thought that p,” 
but not, “He had the thought that p….  
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One way of stating the interest of this distinction is to say that although we 
apply the word "think" to animals, using it as a transitive verb taking a 
propositional phrase as its object, we do not thereby imply that the animal 
formulated or thought of a proposition, or had a proposition "before its mind." In 
saying something about the animal, we employ a verb that, grammatically, takes a 
propositional expression as object, without meaning that as a matter of 
psychological fact the animal thought of a proposition. The next point to see is 
that we employ the verb "think" in the same way in regard to people. On the basis 
of circumstances and behavior we say that a man "thought that p," without 
implying that he thought of p or formulated p, or that p occurred to him or was in 
his thoughts. For example, suppose a friend of mine and I are engrossed in an 
exciting conversation. We are about to drive off in his car. While holding up his 
end of the conversation he fumbles in his pocket for the car keys. I, knowing that 
they are in the glove compartment, say to myself, "He thinks the keys are in his 
pocket." I do not imply that he said to himself, or thought to himself, "The keys 




Malcolm agrees that animals can’t have thoughts because they don’t have language, but that 
doesn’t mean that animals don’t think. According to him, this kind of thinking needn’t even be 
propositional—humans often think in non-propositional ways. Recognizing a friend across the 
street, for instance, is a kind of thinking that isn’t propositional.
153
 We don’t think, “if that is in 
fact Kasper, then I have seen Kasper,” we simply see Kasper. (This phenomenological reality is 
expressed by Heidegger as Zuhandenheit, prior to and not dependent upon Vorhandenheit; we 
must have this intuitive engagement with the world before we can abstract it into language and 
proposition, not the other way around.) Descartes’ problem, according to Malcolm, was that all 
thought for him was propositional and all propositions were linguistic;
154
 Macintyre says that this 
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bias towards mental content in terms of language continues to be the problem for twentieth-
century philosophers like Brandom.
155
  
Brandom, however, unlike Descartes, separates (at least formally) language from 
propositions: language is the capacity of explicating (“expliciting”) the implicit, which we may 
understand as the unarticulated metaphysical or logical structure of things. In the previous 
chapters I’ve tried to show how animals have an implicit understanding of the world apart from 
language; in this chapter, by way of conclusion, I hope to show that we can explicate animals’ 
implicit understanding of the world through language without ascribing to them such forms of 
cogitation. First, I will show how Mark Okrent gives us the tools to understand higher-order 
animals in terms of goal-directedness, something shared with lower-order animals, even non-
rational animals. This is better than thinking of higher-order animals as quasi-linguistic, since 
that position is defeasible and fuzzy, whereas we can clearly understand higher-order animals in 
terms of lower-ordered animals, even non-rational ones. Next I will show how Heidegger gives 
us this paradigm while insisting where Okrent equivocates that only humans have linguistic, self-
conscious rationality. Lastly, I’ll show how, because of language, we can accurately describe 
what animals do, all the while without ascribing language to them.  
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Okrent’s Teleological Understanding of Animal Behavior 
The last thing we want to do when talking about animals is to anthropomorphize them. 
We don’t want to be philosophical “bitees,” people who, according to Vicki Hearne, “are 
contaminated by [their] epistemology…they cast about for some premise from which they can 
draw an inference that will give them certainty about the dog’s behavior,” certainty about their 
own assumptions. We need to be careful not to project our epistemology onto animals lest we be 
bitten by our own assumptions, begging the question. 
The danger of projecting onto animals is easy to fall into if we take a commonsense view 
of epistemology and the problem of other minds—it would seem like this animal is 
contemplating, so it must have thoughts, because when I contemplate, I contemplate thoughts. 
While the argument from analogy and best explanation may hold for the problem of other human 
minds, we can’t be sure the analogy holds for animals—it certainly doesn’t for all animals; and 
the best explanation for animal minds would be based on what we do know—how evolution and 
circumstance determine and affect animal behavior—rather than what we don’t know—the 
relationship between mind and body, between language and intentionality, between natural 
desire and will, etc. Okrent’s solution doesn’t depend on any questionable epistemological or 
phenomenological experience, it simply depends on scientifically observable facts of animal 
nature and behavior. Resting on biology and basic phenomenological observation, Okrent’s 
philosophy of animal minds is no more suspect as a theory than the theory of evolution upon 
which he draws. 
The argument for animal minds by analogy to that of humans is essentially the 








provides a layered-cake view of rationality, a hierarchy of more sophisticated kinds of rationality 
built upon less sophisticated kinds of rationality, ultimately founded on rudimentary, non-
rational goal-directed behavior. He explains how a teleological account of intentionality can 
make sense of animal minds by way of what makes for rational, normative action without falling 
into a the hermeneutic circle of behaviorism. What we appeal to is not the behavior itself—any 
behavior—but normative behavior—what’s appropriate for that animal to do. At base, this 
normativity is a biological or evolutionary teleology.  
Recall the Sphex wasp from earlier: the wasp has a series of goals by virtue of being a 
wasp, namely survival and reproduction, and the ability to achieve these goals. We can say that 
the wasp has reasons to do what it does: there is a reason why it checks the hole before putting 
the caterpillar in there—to make sure there’s no predator waiting for a free lunch. But the wasp is 
not cognizant of such reasons, and so Okrent claims they are nonrational: “The behavior of the 
wasp has a goal, even if it is not the result of any rational thought on the part of the wasp. So 
causation by the beliefs and desires of the agent can’t be part of what it is for the behavior to 
have a goal.”
156
 Thus the behaviorist is wrong to assume beliefs and desires from behavior, 
because the wasp doesn’t have beliefs and desires though it has goals. Okrent is establishing the 
fact that goal-directedness does not depend on beliefs and desires, thus there is no circle of 
causality, but rather an objective standard or norm, against which we can evaluate behavior. 
Conformity to the teleological good for Okrent is the normative base by which we can evaluate 
animal behavior.  
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Rationality, Mental Content, and Okrent’s Linguistic Bias 
Intentionality—by which Okrent means (mental) beliefs and desires—is  understood as 
fundamentally good-directed behavior, and what makes the behavior good or not is whether it is 
normatively appropriate in light of evolutionary (general) and circumstantial (specific) goals. 
Okrent sees himself as showing the instrumental roots of intentionality, just as Heidegger 
showed the more basic Zuhandenheit as foundational for Vorhandenheit. But while Heidegger is 
careful to reserve any kind of discursivity from animals, Okrent’s emphasis on intentionality in 
higher-order animals betrays a linguistic bias towards rationality that both ostracizes lower-order 
animals and minimizes the difference between animal and human intentionality. Based on his 
own arguments for lower-order animals, however, we do not need to ascribe linguistic mental 
content to higher-order animals, even if they do display sophisticatedly rational intentionality. 
Okrent credits his thesis to the Heidegger of Being and Time, though he departs from 
Heidegger in two ways. Okrent agrees with Heidegger “that no agent could possess 
understanding unless it was capable of acting in order to achieve some end or goal,”
157
 but 
Okrent argues that “Creatures that are not Dasein act in order to achieve ends.”
158
 This, however, 
is not really in disagreement with Heidegger. According to Theodore Kisiel,  
understanding [Verstehen] is first identified in KNS [Kriegsnotsemester] 1919 as 
a ‘hermeneutic intuition’ (ZBP [Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA 56/57] 
117) based on nonreflective experiencing of experience; this is regarded as a kind 
of ‘sympathy’ (ZBP 110) that life has of itself…understanding is more an 
                                                 
 
157
 Ibid., xi. 
158













Not until Verstehen is linked with Seinverstehändnis in Prolegomena (SS 1925) do we get a kind 
of understanding as self-understanding that gives rise to the question of being.
160
 Indeed, Kiesel 
points out that the “emphasis on the projection of possibility [in understanding] emerges only in 
BT [Being and Time] itself.”
161
 Being and Time, of course, is primarily about the being of 
Dasein, and, as we discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, Heidegger’s conception of animal 
understanding and the distinctive aspects of Dasein’s understanding are perfectly consistent. The 
distinctive aspects of Dasein’s particular form of understanding, e.g. self-understanding and 
contemplation of counterfactuals, does not preclude nor ignore nondiscursive understanding; 
human understanding, however, is what allows us to understand understanding, to have world, to 
be world-forming.  
 Heidegger, therefore, would not take issue with Okrent on understanding in animals, but 
he would take issue with extending the distinctively human aspects of understanding, reflexive 
and futural mental content, to higher-order animals. Indeed, this is why, as we discussed last 
chapter, Heidegger chooses the most animal of animals as his examples, to show the “abysmal 
bodily kinship with the beast”: he wants to show how other the animal is as animal, so that when 
we see the similarities between us and dolphins or dogs, we don’t forget the “abyss” that 
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 Okrent, in giving animals mental content, has built a bridge to nowhere across 
the abyss. (We’ll discuss this below.) 
Okrent’s second divergence is similar: Dasein, he says, can only be understood as a “kind 
of rational animal,” albeit a “distinctive” one, that is “intelligible only as modifications of 
simpler [life]forms; Heidegger explicitly says that “Dasein is never to be defined ontologically 
by regarding it as life…plus something else.”
163
 While Okrent’s position sounds nice and 
current, it’s actually much harder to defend. Heidegger doesn’t have to give an account of how 
language and self-understanding arise evolutionarily since that’s simply the mechanism to ask 
such metaphysical questions, and it’s nonsensical to ask how that ability arose—we’re simply 
thrown into such a position. Since Okrent is trying to build from the evolutionary bottom up, he 
must offer some account of how language and self-consciousness arise, and this is a much harder 
position to defend than the straightforward Heideggerian position. By implicitly insisting that 
animals have linguistic mental content, Okrent has committed himself to an inexplicable 
phenomenon; I hope to show why, by his own arguments about lower-order animals, we don’t 
need to ascribe linguistic mental content in order to meaningfully ascribe intentionality to higher-
order animals.  
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Problems with Okrent’s Account of Animal Minds 
Okrent argues that “the kind of highly definite intentional contents characteristic of 
human action and intentionality are related to and arise out of the merely instrumental rationality 
and vague mental contents characteristic of nonlinguistic animals,” and yet his view of animal 
intentionality closely resembles that of human intentionality. 
164
 Quasi-discursive mental states 
are unlikely and unfalsifiable for a number of reasons which I’ll discuss below; for now, let’s 
review his general hierarchy of animal minds and what he means by rationality. 
There are four categories of mind in Okrent’s reckoning: nonrational, biological behavior 
(evolutionarily determined goals), intentionality (individually determined goals), social-reason 
(group-determined goals), and human (self-determining goals). As we move up this great chain 
of rationality, animals in the higher categories have all the more basic kinds of (non)rationality, 
but these are teleologically subservient to their dominant or characteristic type. For example, the 
goals of the social animal are not merely concerned with its own (or its children’s) welfare; the 
goals of survival, reproduction, etc. remain, but they are now secondary to the goals of the 
group.
165
 Humans are unique in that our rationality is governed by goals that we ourselves 
(personally, but also in the context of a discursive, and we might add, already existing 
community) decide are the goals we wish to pursue. We are the authors, so to speak, of the 
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normativity that governs rational human behavior; or to put it more precisely, the human 
teleology is to determine our own teleology.
166
  
Barring such distinctly human exceptions, animals are rational if they normatively act 
towards individual and species-specific goals, and, for Okrent, such individual goals must be 
intentional—corresponding to beliefs and desires
167
—and they must be able to adapt to novel 
situations, revising both beliefs and desires. It’s unclear, however, why these are necessary 
conditions for rationality. The problem with his account of intentionality is that it is implicitly 
discursive; adaptivity is a quantitative, not qualitative difference between wasps and birds; 
idiosyncratic goals (meaning goals actively determined by the agent),
168
 similarly, are quantitatively, 
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not qualitatively, different than more basic goals and behavior, especially individually-tailored ones 
like flight, feeding, and reproduction. 
Okrent links rationality with “intentional contents, such as beliefs and desires…[and] 
versatile adaptive behavior that varies in response to changing circumstances, responds effectively to 
the source of the agent’s mistakes, and is novel in relation to the agent’s species-specific patterns of 
life.”
169
 Furthermore, to be “rational,” an animal must have “unique, changing, and idiosyncratic 
goals and perceptions of the world, states that need not be shared with other members of its 
species.”
170
 But don’t wasps fit this category in a very minimal sense? Okrent here echoes the 
Cartesian view of sensation and behavior: some behavior is merely the mechanical response to 
sensation, some behavior is guided by or determined by the will. The only difference is that Okrent 
has allowed all animals except those like wasps to be in both categories, whereas Descartes allowed 
only humans to have both kinds of behavior. Okrent now just grants that other animals besides 
humans have propositional content, beliefs and desires. Animal intentionality—if it’s idiosyncratic 
and sufficiently versatile—is now the requirement, not a human soul. But again, machines are not a 
sufficient analogy for animals like wasps. Let’s discuss this problem generally before showing how it 
betrays a discursive bias towards mental content. 
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Rationality: Descriptive, not Ascriptive; Quantitative, not Qualitative 
The problem with Okrent’s view of rationality as necessarily involving intentional 
content is that it is an implicitly discursive view of mind: our mental content is discursive, but 
it’s indefensible to assume animals have similar mental content. Rationality is a category of 
ascription, not a state of mind. We can’t know whether animals have mental content that 
“provide reasons for what they do” without again anthropomorphizing them, confusing thinking 
with thoughts.
171
 Based on what Okrent has shown us about wasps and teleology, we are not 
anthropomorphizing when we ascribe to them goals of which they are (he supposes) unaware; 
but are we really to suppose that the other animals are aware of their goals—individual, social, 
or biological? Okrent oversteps here and is asserting something indefensible without needing to. 
We already have the mechanism by which to understand animal behavior as rational because of 
the Sphex wasp—if only we grant that the wasp can be described as rational. 
Why not call the wasp’s actions rational (without implying it has thoughts or even thinks) 
if we can describe it as goal-directed even though it has no concept of its goals? (Similarly, if 
animals don’t need to express intentionality linguistically to have rationality, according to 
Okrent, why must we assume they have intentionality at all—isn’t goal-directedness enough? I’ll 
return to this later.) This logic is obvious to MacIntyre: “To ascribe goods to dolphins makes it 
natural to ascribe to them reasons for doing much that they do.”
172
 He goes on to quote Warren 
Quinn: “a reason to act in a certain way is nothing more than something good in itself that it [the 
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action] realizes or serves, or, short of that, something bad in itself that it avoids.”
173
 Notice that 
neither MacIntyre nor Quinn makes any mention of beliefs and desires, let alone idiosyncratic 
and adaptive goals; all animals act rationally if they act in accord with the normative teleology 
appropriate to the animal. 
Okrent grants that “all goal-directed organic behavior is reliably responsive to local 
differences in the environment of the agent,” but “Only…instrumentally rational agents, who 
alter the goals of their immediate acts and alter their acts so as to succeed in novel circumstances, 
can properly be said to have reasons for what they do.”
174
 Why? Okrent says that  
[instrumentally rational animals] act for proximate goals that are not fixed by their 
species-defined life processes. This difference allows instrumentally rational 
agents to respond successfully to alterations or details in their environments for 





What would make for a goal that’s not fixed by species-defined life processes? Okrent only 
explains this negatively: “as soon as something unique, unexpected, or simply incapable of 
sensible differentiation by wasps turns up in the environment, the individual wasp is at a loss.”
176
 
He gives the example of how moving the caterpillar while the wasp is in the burrow will make 
the wasp start chain of behavior over again, effectively getting stuck in a loop. But wouldn’t any 
animal be at a loss if it encountered something it couldn’t comprehend or deal with? Even if we 
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grant that flexible, adaptive richness is a meaningful distinction between higher and lower 
animals, are we sure it’s not a quantitative difference instead a qualitative difference?
177
 Okrent 
insists it’s a qualitative difference, though he often compares the wasp and the bird in 
quantitative terms (e.g., “a very small range of options” versus “numerous behavioral forks”).
178
  
For instance, one easy way to test your dog’s intelligence is to have him sit and swiftly throw a 
small blanket or large towel over his head: the faster the dog escapes, the more intelligent he is; 
but a dog that just lies there, while not particularly bright, doesn’t cease to be rational, just like 
infant animals who can’t yet account for various experiences aren’t thus labeled nonrational; to 
affirm this would be to fall back into behaviorism.  
What’s at issue here is confusing success of an action with appropriateness of an action—
a distinction Okrent made as early as Chapter 2. What makes teleological behavior normative is 
whether it’s appropriate behavior, not whether the behavior in question itself is successful, 
though what makes it appropriate has to do with a tending towards or statistical likelihood of 
successful goal completion. Okrent therefore contradicts himself in saying that the wasp is not 
rational “because of her failure to respond appropriately to the scientist’s intervention.”
179
 
Appropriate upon what grounds? She is acting appropriately according to the goals and means to 
achieve those goals of wasps: (1) dig burrow—(2) sting caterpillar—(3) bring caterpillar to edge 
                                                 
 
177
 Similarly, being unable to differentiate is not a mark against rationality as such, as Okrent 
insists, only against the degree or order of rationality. See below. 
178
 Okrent, 119. 
179








of burrow—(4) check burrow—[(5a) deal with intruder]—(5b)put caterpillar outside in the 
hole—(6) lay eggs—(7) cover up hole; if the caterpillar isn’t outside the hole at 5a, then 
obviously the wasp must perform 3 again, followed by 4, etc. This may be a “routine,” but it’s 
unclear to me why the routine of the wasp “always acting according to a set species-defining 
behavioral pattern” precludes the behavior as rational.
180
 
 Let’s suppose, for instance, that an otherwise normal person shares a house with an 
innocuous but rather annoying ghost who likes to turn off the lights he’s using. Sometimes, in 
order to read at night, the man must sit by the light switch and flip it on again every so often in 
order to keep reading. Would Okrent consider the man to be acting nonrationally by turning the 
light back on repeatedly? Must the man find a novel means of illuminating the page to be 
considered rational? It would seem that such an action by the reader and the wasp are no less 
rational than any other proximate goal pursued in response to an unexpected (or at least 
undesired) interruption. 
Granted, wasps don’t have beliefs and desires; if birds do, then where’s the break? What 
about toads? They’re deceivable by scientists. Karen Neander discusses at length how toads see 
only “inter-aural disparities,” and thus anything shaped like prey and moving like prey will elicit 
the toad to get it with its tongue—no matter if it’s actually a fly or a piece of lead.
181
 And yet, 
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either way, the behavior is considered appropriate by neuroethologists.
182
 Shouldn’t we likewise 
consider the wasp as acting appropriately by continuing to behave according to its species-
specific means of achieving its goals? Okrent has no problem saying that the mistakes of 
intentional animals are justified (because appropriate if not successful); why not with 
nonintentional animals?
183
 Okrent here is less careful than he is later about confusing the success 
of the act with the appropriateness of the act. As Fodor puts it, “Darwin cares how many flies 
you eat, not what descriptions you eat them under.”
184
 Okrent again is at fault for giving 
overblown, linguistic goals to lower-order animals: “The frog flicks its tongue in order to catch 
an insect so as to make it a meal so that it can be nourished.”
185
 Why Okrent thinks that a 
“nonrational” toad has such complex goals is beyond me. The frog or toad’s goal is simply 
survival, and such animals survive by responding to visual stimuli of a certain shape and 
movement. This tends towards nourishment by eating flies, but we may assume that seeds or 
organic debris may occasionally look like flies to the animal without putting the appropriateness 
of the action into question. That a scientist can “trick” the frog doesn’t make the frog’s actions 
any less appropriate than they are for natural fly-like-moving objects—which is to say, the 
actions are perfectly appropriate. 
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Okrent discusses the “case of the poor frog,” but, while he doesn’t blame the frog for 
being incapable of making such distinctions, this proves for him that such animals aren’t rational, 
since they “do not have reasons of their own for doing what they do.”
186
 But we may easily 
imagine that over time—a lot of time perhaps—the frog may learn to differentiate lead balls 
from flies, just as the cat learned—very quickly—to differentiate shrews from mice. (See section 
4.33 below.) The frog will not make this differentiation cognitively; evolution, however, might 
shape its goals and abilities to achieve those goals through natural selection. One possible story 
might go like this: A mutation develops whereby smells affect the accuracy of frogs, fly-smells 
stimulate the frog brain, increasing its accuracy, and/or lead-smells hamper the frog’s accuracy 
or generally disturb the frog. Over time, frogs with a strong sense of smell will be chosen for, 
adding the sense of smell to that of sight in its “eating” behavior, and thus will now 
“differentiate” between what was previously the same stimuli, millions of years prior. This 
doesn’t rely on mental states, and shows how success is actually related to appropriate behavior. 
What’s normative is biological and evolutionary, not what we think is normative for the frog. Of 
course we do understand it as normative—and rational—if we remember that appropriate 
behavior is species-relative (evolutionary/biological), not relative to the individual animal 
(intentional successes).  
Okrent is overly focused on the individual animal and mental states, and he wants to 
think of rationality as a mental state instead of as a category. He says that frogs “are not rational 
and do not have reasons of their own for doing what they do, even though there are of course 











good reasons for them to act in certain ways.”
187
 Okrent undercuts his theory by making 
rationality depend on mental states; he has brilliantly shown how normativity is objectively 
teleological, grounding what we mean by rationality, but unnecessarily adds intentionality to 
teleology in his definition. A much simpler and powerful thesis would have been simply to 
define rationality as normatively good goal-directedness. Instead, we have an ambiguous 
category of nonrational animals, including wasps and frogs, and rational animals, but this 
distinction is problematically vague—no longer objective and simple.
188
 What’s worse, Okrent 
conceives of intentionality as linguistic, raising further worries and doubts about the 
description’s viability, as I’ll show below. I think that it makes more sense to link rationality 
with teleology: rational actions are those that are in line with the normative teleology of the 
animal—for there are “good reasons for them to act in certain ways,” even if the animal doesn’t 
have such reasons. Thinking doesn’t require thoughts, and one doesn’t need reason to act 
reasonably. 
 
Okrent’s Implicitly Discursive Bias in Mental Content 
Okrent’s insistence that rationality must be thought in terms of idiosyncratic and adaptive 
intentionality betrays that the mental content of beliefs for animals is inherently discursive for 
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him. When he gives putative beliefs to wasps, they’re overblown to show how ridiculous such an 
assertion would be; this straw-man attack, however, just shows how difficult it is to defend 
rationality as intentionality, and how, implicitly, Okrent thinks of mental content as linguistic:  
But if the wasp indeed acts on this desire, then the companion belief that 
motivates what the wasp does must be something like “This cricket will still be 





How indeed! How could Okrent really put such language into a wasp? And how could he do it 
twice? 
But, in this case, the belief that would work with this desire to explain the 
behavior would have the content “I could find out whether there is something 




By overplaying his hand (who’s insisting that wasps have intentional mental states?), 
Okrent reveals that he views the intentional mental states of animals as implicitly discursive. 
Indeed, Okrent describes rationality as “an ability to infer beliefs from information available to 
[an agent] in the environment and an ability to establish new proximate goals in light of those 
beliefs.”
191
 This sounds like Brandom’s description of human rationality: the giving and taking 
of reasons as reasons. But this would not please Brandom, not even my revised Brandom that 
allows for implicit inferences: the taking of reasons for reason is what Brandom means by 
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“expliciting,” the making explicit of implicit inferences and the manipulation of those inferences 
in a web of meaning. This is discursive thought. 
For Okrent, what distinguishes humans from animals is not language per se; humans 
simply have several degrees of beliefs and desires, and this allows us to have reflection, to act on 
abstract concepts, and even to generate our own normative goals.
192
 He admits that such things 
are possible only because of language, but he emphasizes the connection between animals and 
humans based on shared intentionality, though of varying degrees: “The finely discriminated 
contents of human intentional states do depend on the existence of language, but this fact should 
never obscure the truth that language itself is possible only for a certain kind of instrumentally 
rational agent.”
193
 He is trying to say that the philosophical tradition had erred in 
overemphasizing the discursive difference between humans and other animals, and Okrent has 
tried to correct the approach by showing how we can only understand the human mind fully if 
we understand our shared rationality with animals. This is the same motivation as Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s in Dependent Rational Animals, but MacIntyre is careful to preserve the discursive 
separation (and spends a whole chapter on why animals like dolphins, no matter the complexity 
of their communication, do not have language as such). Okrent is not as careful, and in 
emphasizing the connection of intentionality between humans and higher-order animals, he 
allows discursivity to bleed into the mental content of animals. 
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Ironically, Okrent repeats the traditional mistake of anthropomorphizing animal minds. 
When comparing  humans and animals, Okrent is more careful, but when just discussing animals 
(especially the difference between higher- and lower-order animals) he often slips into describing 
intentional content in discursive terms. He claims that the behavior of the Plover bird gives a 
“convincing flavor of logic and thoughtfulness,” in contrast to the Sphex wasp that betrays, he 
thinks, a nonrational routine.
194
 As we see in the passage quoted above, the putative mental 
content of the wasp is ridiculously discursive, especially for a bug.  
Okrent’s view of mental intentionality is tainted with projections of discourse into the 
minds of animals. This anthropomorphism of the higher-order animals becomes obvious when 
applied to the lower-order animals. Rather than recognize his projection of discursivity onto 
animals, he simply rejects animals like wasps as nonrational.  
By making mental content overly discursive, Okrent shows his bias towards discursive 
intentionality in animals; what he’s trying to do is show how wasps can’t have beliefs, therefore 
they can’t have rationality. But animals don’t need to have thoughts to think; they don’t even 
have to think to be described as rational if they are acting according to their appropriate 
teleological norms. Initially, Okrent tied intentionality with goal-directedness, not rationality.
195
 
Okrent’s watershed insight has nothing to do with rationality per se, but with teleology, that we 
can evaluate behavior based on goal-directedness.  
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For some reason, Okrent gets sidetracked with rationality as teleology, rather than 
preserving the genius of the teleological project as it’s presented early in the book. In the next 
section I will show how we can properly understand intentionality in terms of instrumentality, 
thus showing why we don’t need animal instrumentalism to be discursive at all. 
 
Mental States Aren’t Necessary to Understand Animals as Rational 
I’ve just shown how easy it is to make mistakes about mental content; let me now show 
how biological teleology can explain how intentionality works without appealing to discursive 
mental states. Okrent features two animals in his book, the Sphex wasp and the plover bird, as 
paradigm cases of biological and intentional teleology. He focuses on them, in part, because his 
argument for teleology in simple animals like wasps and his anti-behaviorist account of 
intentionality in animals like birds is the bulk and genius of his project, providing an objective 
way to understand normativity in a noncircular, nonreductive way.  
 Okrent begins with the account of the Plover bird, and it is in terms of the intentionality 
of the bird that he believes we can make sense of the goal-directedness of the wasp: 
The ethologist can present the versatile adaptability of the plover’s behavior as a 
datum because that addictiveness is a characteristic of the behavior itself, not the 
plover. The behavior displays the pattern of tending to change so as to bring about 
a result that varies as a function of the actual environment and the prior state of 




Okrent argues against Fred Dretske that it is possible for behavior to be normative apart from 
normative beliefs and desires. Okrent says that Dretske's worries stem from the recognition that 
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logical behaviorism, which sought to understand mental states in terms of behavior, “failed 
because it is inevitably circular.”
197
 Okrent argues that it isn’t circular because we can evaluate 
behavior according to norms that don’t circle back to beliefs and desires, and to do this he 
introduces the Sphex wasp, his example of biologically motivated animals, showing how 
behavior is teleologically normative apart from mental states. He does this to free mental states 
from the logical behaviorist’s circular reasoning; that is, Okrent believes higher-order animals do 
have intentionality because he thinks it’s the best explanation for what they do, and so he wants 
to show that normativity is outside the cyclical normative causal structure of intentions and 
behavior. He introduces biological teleology via the Sphex wasp to show normativity that 
doesn’t depend on beliefs and desires, thus freeing him to attribute beliefs and desires to animals. 
If we can explain behavior without appealing to intentionality, then we don’t fall into a 
hermeneutical circle of understanding normativity based on their relation. I’m arguing, however, 
that if we can already understand appropriate animal action based on teleological norms, we 
don’t need to worry about mental content. 
I concede that intentionality may seem to be an easier explanation, but in fact it merely 
raises more and harder questions. I wish to remain agnostic on the topic: since we don’t need to 
explain mental content to explain behavioral rationality, let’s not invoke it. By way of analogy, I 
believe that positing God is the simplest explanation for why the world is the way it is, but that 
doesn’t mean we should invoke God when we are describing the way the world works. Though 
we may believe in God’s immanence and sustenance of the world, to invoke him in explaining 
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the motions of the planets raises more questions or is simply unnecessary. Just so with animal 
minds: whether they don’t have mental states (like the Sphex wasp), or they may (like the Plover 
bird), doesn’t bear on their normative behavior. Only with humans does normativity of beliefs 
and desires matter apart from behavior, since our distinct teleology is the self-creation of our 
own beliefs and desires for normativity.
198
 
Okrent insists on intentionality in animals, reasonably enough, because it fits his 
hierarchy of teleological rationality quite nicely. Simple animals like wasps have a kind of 
biological, evolutionary programming that determines their goals. Complex animals display 
versatile and idiosyncratic goals based on their beliefs and desires. Social animals have goals 
created by and shared with a community. Humans act for our own goals and have self-conscious, 
linguistic rationality that informs the lower kinds of rationality. These divisions seem right, but 
we don’t need to talk about beliefs and desires in the second group as what motivates the more 
novel goals any more than we need to talk about what motivates the community’s goals and 
actions. Indeed, the impossibility of defending any explanation of mental content in animals is 
apparent when we try to do the same with lower or higher animals: the wasp’s motivations are 
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intuitive; the group’s motivations are also intuitive. Even if the group uses communication 
(though this in itself would be hard to defend), it’s unreasonable to assume that the group 
communicates its group goals and the means, e.g., that the female penguins should go hunt, and 
the male penguins should care for their eggs, and if it gets cold, the whole group will be warmer 
if we huddle together. No! Even if the penguins can and do communicate—it’s cold—huddle 
together—that does not bear on the normative good of the group huddling together when it gets 
cold, just like the wasp doesn’t have to have any conception of what it’s doing for it to be 
normatively appropriate. Why then does Okrent insist that mental states are important for 
understanding intentional action? Just as the wasp and the penguin flock don’t have to have any 
awareness of appropriate action for their action to be right, so too intentional animals don’t need 
to have awareness of their intentionality. Beliefs and desires needn’t be explicit mental states or 
content for animals to act in a way that we can call intentional or rational. 
My contention is that Okrent need not insist on explicit mental states for intentional 
animals; it is not necessary or simpler, and so the burden of proof falls on Okrent. The Plover 
bird may seem to be making judgments, and this may seem to imply mental states, or we may 
just be anthropomorphizing its rationality. If the plover bird has beliefs about how to misdirect 
the predator, and it changes its behavior based on the success of or failure of its plans, then the 
bird would seem to be making judgments and have ideas, so to speak. But couldn’t we just be 
reading into its actions like so many pet owners tend to do?
199
 It seems to me, however, that the 
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bird can be making judgments without explicit mental states. Okrent does not give us any reason 
to think that the plover bird acts otherwise than in a series of intuitive, richly diverse directedness 
towards a goal—like a master chess player. 
 
If Animals Could Play Chess: Mental Content and Automatic Agency 
The plover bird seems to be doing something like playing chess: it knows possible moves 
it can do, possible moves the other can do, and knows how its moves may affect the moves of the 
other and vice versa. However, as even an amateur chess player knows, sometimes when you are 
planning moves several steps removed, you all of a sudden get an aha! moment, and move 
without any planning: you simply see a great move. Indeed, good chess players play speed chess 
games this way—they just see the right moves and execute them. Are we in a position to say that 
the plover bird doesn’t just act intuitively this way? The burden of proof for mental states thus 
falls on Okrent, since we can explain animal behavior in general (e.g. the wasp) as normative 
without reference to mental states, and rich, adaptive behavior (e.g. the bird) can be explained as 
the intuitive grasp of the world. 
That higher-order animals have an intuitive grasp of the world is a more conservative 
statement than Okrent’s attribution of mental states. Mental states, at least for Okrent, implies 
representation and explicit counterfactuals—in short, human reason. In Heidegger’s view of the 










 Yet the fact that this secondary account is not primary does not render it trivial—
this is the domain of everydayness, and moreover, of science (no small matter). Yet we only 
arrive at this stage, he claims, when the hammer breaks, when our intuitive grasp of the world is 
shattered. The question Okrent must answer is whether or not animals experience un-readiness-
to-hand (Unzuhandenheit), as Dasein does; that is, when the intuitive grasp of the world breaks 
down for the plover, does it really consider things in an objective, vorhanden way, or does it just 
move on intuitively?  
Heidegger gives three instances of Unzuhandenheit: unusability, lacking, and 
obstruction.
201
 Unzuhandenheit has “the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of 
presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand,” although “the presence-at-hand which makes itself 
known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment” and this vorhanden 
understanding is “not thematic.”
202
 That is, Unzuhandenheit is still a mode—however 
“deficient”
203
—of Zuhandenheit, and this deficiency makes the zuhanden conspicuous, thus 
leading, possibly for Dasein, to Vorhandenheit. Since the conspicuousness is not thematic, 
however, it is not necessarily vorhanden. Thus animals, if they experience some kind of 
Zuhandenheit, can also experience Unzuhandenheit without necessarily leading them to 
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Vorhandenheit. The plover bird, for instance, seems to experience Unzuhandenheit when its 
broken wing display fails; that does not mean, however, that the bird begins then to think in a 
vorhanden way, thematically or linguistically revising its beliefs and desires—the burden of 
proof falls on Okrent, for even in our human engagement with the world, Unzuhandenheit does 
not necessarily catapult us into Vorhandenheit; we may fix the tool, find the missing thing, or 
remove the obstruction all in a zuhanden way. 
In fact, we have every reason to believe that animals don’t experience a breakdown in 
their engagement of the world that leads to Vorhandenheit, because for that to happen, animals 
would have to have a profound self-awareness and reflective ability to comprehend 
counterfactuals—discourse and all that entails—and this is not something that Okrent (let alone 
Brandom and Heidegger) is ready to grant to any other animal besides the human.  
There is a vast difference between apprehending and comprehending, as Anthony Esolen 
points out in the introduction to his translation of Dante’s Paradise. Concerning heavenly things, 
we are “dealing with mysteries that the human mind can apprehend but not comprehend, can 
glimpse but not fathom”;
204
 similarly, animal minds can only apprehend what we can 
comprehend, glimpse what we can fathom. MacIntyre rightly says that “only language enables us 
to reflect on the truth or falsity of our beliefs, and so to consider reflectively about any particular 
belief, as to whether it is true or false. But we do not need language to mark the most elementary 
distinction between truth and falsity.”
205
 Okrent seems to think that an animal can only act 
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intentionally or propositionally if that animal has intentional mental content that can serve as 
reasons for acting, and the animal must be able to reflect on such beliefs and desires for its 
actions to be considered rational. The problem is in the last part: animals don’t need reflection to 
have mental states or beliefs and desires: the dog simply believes the squirrel is up this tree 
because he saw it go up there; if he sees it cross the phone lines to another tree, his beliefs about 
the location of the squirrel will change, but that doesn’t require reflection. Instead, higher-order 
animals simply live in a normatively rich, intuitive, modal world. Modality does not necessitate 
contemplation of possibility, only real possibilities for action (what the wasp lacks).  
Intentionality lies between the nonintentionality of wasps and the linguistic rationality of 
humans; Okrent believes that higher-order animals have beliefs and desires like humans, and that 
allows them to have idiosyncratic and adaptive goals; this, however, seems to imply an analogy 
to the human mind, namely discursive reflection, which is misleading, since animals don’t have 
discourse. So what might nondiscursive beliefs look like? 
MacIntyre gives the example of cats eating shrews: a cat will treat a shrew like a mouse 
until it eats the shrew and becomes violently ill, after which it leaves shrews alone.
206
 The cat 
now has beliefs about shrews, so to speak, that it didn’t have before; in fact, the cat now makes a 
distinction between the two that it didn’t make before. The cat may now have the belief that 
such-living-things [shrews] are different-from-[mice] and are not-to-be-eaten, but what this 
might be doesn’t matter. The mental content does not affect the appropriateness of initially 
treating a mouse-like animal as a mouse, of sharpening distinctions of mice and non-mice, and of 
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avoiding non-mice. It doesn’t matter what the beliefs are like, or if there even are any; what 










EXPLICATION ON BEHALF OF ANIMALS 
 
Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but 






I’ve now shown why we don’t need to make the argument as strong as Okrent believes. 
Just as we can understand instrumental behavior of wasps by way of goal-directed behavior of 
higher-order animals, so too can we explicate goal-directed behavior of higher-order animals in 
terms of intentionality without attributing mental states to such animals. That is, we can explicate 
the implicit inferences of animals on their behalf.  
Softening Okrent’s broad conception of rationality thus makes Okrent’s teleological 
intentionality more plausible, since we can remain skeptical about the mental states of animals. 
At the same time, this mitigated teleological intentionality enhances the Brandomian account of 
intentionality by reserving explicit inferences for humans while at the same time extending 
rationality as implicit inferences to animals. This is of course my central thesis, but as an added 
bonus, by assimilating Okrent into Brandom’s framework we no longer need to depart from 
Heidegger in the two ways mentioned in the last chapter. Understanding now may remain 
discursive and exclusively proper to Dasein while at the same time conceding goal-directed 
behavior to animals, since what counts as goal-directedness remains only explicated discursively 
by Dasein even though the animals indeed do act in such a way.  
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Similarly, though we keep the overarching normative structure of Okrent’s teleological 
rationality, we now understand that structure from the perspective of Dasein. Thus we are not 
merely adding discourse on top of evolutionary, instrumental, and social rationality; we can only 
understand instrumental, behavioral, and social rationality by way of discourse, through the 
world of Dasein. 
Mightn’t we begin, as Heidegger does, with the human understanding of the worlds and 
rationality in terms of Dasein? I believe this is what Okrent is implicitly doing: though he insists 
that rationality springs from the ground up, I warrant, à la Heidegger, that discursive rationality 
is that ground, that Grund, from which we can understand other rationalities, including those that 
are “nonrational” or nonintentional, derivatively.  
Okrent argues that we can make sense of instrumentality by way of behavioral or goal-
directed behavior, though such goals are not mental in lower-order animals. Animals like wasps 
respond predictably to various stimuli, and thus lack the flexible, adaptive richness of higher-
order animals. Nonetheless, Okrent argues that we can make sense of this seemingly 
programmed behavior in terms of goals. More specifically, Okrent believes “that there are very 
good reasons to believe that the behavior of some animals is explicable by appealing to the goals 
of the behavior even though those animals do not act rationally [intentionally].”
208
 Indeed, much 
of Okrent’s project consists of showing how we can normatively explicate animal rationality 
based on their specific teleologies. A—or perhaps the—human-specific goal is to understand the 
world, including animals; why-asking, be it metaphysics or science or whatever you want to call 
                                                 
 
208








it, is an essential aspect being human, and philosophy (let’s call it) is only possible because of—
or at least in—language.  
Animals, no matter now rich their engagement in and understanding of the world and 
other things, do not ask why there is something and not nothing. Indeed, we may be suspect of 
their wondering why of anything.
209
 It is the human who wonders, leading her to do philosophy, 
and it is language that allows us to do both.  
I contend that we can’t understand animals without discourse. Indeed, for this reason 
Okrent insists that animals have mental states, for this is, in some ways, a vulgar kind of 
discursiveness. But we need not bastardize our notion of discourse and insist animals have it. 
The better explanation is to remain skeptical about whether they do or don’t, instead of 
attributing to them some putative nondiscursive “vague mental contents.”
210
 Indeed, Okrent 
admits in Chapter 7 that language makes possible the complex mental states of humans, but he 
doesn’t appreciate the profundity of human discourse and the dangers of (over)extending it 
towards animals. 
How humans explicate on behalf of animals is rather simple; indeed, we’ve been doing it 
this whole time—even in Brandom’s chauvinistic examples. Regarding  Brandom’s parrot, 
Wanderer explains how easy this is:  
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 While animals may inquire “why” in the sense of “what” (why that noise? why that 
sensation? etc.), this is really inquiring after something (what’s that noise? what’s that 
sensation? etc.), not wonder. Animals may inquire, but can’t marvel. 
210








[even assuming parrots don’t have normative attitudes,] I…can nonetheless treat 
the reliably trained parrot’s uttering “Raawk, that’s red”, as having the normative 
status of being appropriate. …The significance of the vocal performance is 





That is, even if the bird isn’t aware of the norms, we can evaluate it according to those norms. 
We need only point out that besides such arbitrary norms, we are also in a position to evaluate 
the natural behavior of animals according to the normative teleology that Okrent outlined. We 
don’t need to postulate whether the bird is aware of norms (beliefs and desires) to evaluate it 
according to norms. As Okrent says, “Natural agents [animals] act as they do because by their 
natures. Reflective agents act as they do because they accept reasons from which they can infer 
actions that are appropriate given those reasons.”
212
 As Brandom rightly explains, humans live in 
a realm of giving and taking for reasons, and part of that realm involves understanding the 
reasons animals act; even if they don’t know their implicit reasons for acting, we can make those 
reasons explicit for them. 
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 Wanderer, 20. 
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